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CALIFORNIA, ARE YOU THERE? IT’S THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CALLING AND WE
NEED NET NEUTRALITY
Olivia Young*
With online streaming rapidly replacing cable as the preferred method
of media consumption for viewers, demand for online content is at an alltime high. Behind the scenes of the entertainment evolution is an open and
neutral Internet that facilitates equal access to all online content. Until recently, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) committed to preserving the neutral net by passing Net Neutrality regulations that prohibited
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from blocking, throttling, or prioritizing
online content. That changed on December 14, 2017, when the FCC repealed Net Neutrality, lifting the restrictions that once prevented ISPs from
differentially transmitting online content. ISPs are now free to create a hierarchy of content prioritization that favors the content they own and the content hosted by streaming services capable of paying the greatest prioritization
fees. This hierarchy has the potential to reduce innovation in the online
streaming service industry by creating financial barriers to entry that keep
smaller streaming services out, limiting the diversity of content accessible
by consumers.
This Note first describes the history of the Internet’s regulation that
preceded Net Neutrality’s repeal, then explains the repeal’s potential consequences on online streaming services and consumers. Next, this Note offers
solutions to Net Neutrality’s repeal. Finally, this Note concludes with a call
to action, encouraging those who care about the future of a neutral Internet
to not stand idle.

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like to begin
by thanking her parents for supplying endless love, support, and cups of tea throughout the writing
of this piece. The author would also like to thank her advisor, Professor Karl Manheim, for his
feedback, guidance, and encouragement, as well as the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Review editorial board for making the publication of this piece possible. Finally, the author would
like to thank her friend, Elise Creighton, for not only serving as an incredible source of friendship
over the past thirteen years, but for introducing her to the importance of Net Neutrality and emboldening her to do something about its repeal.
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INTRODUCTION

On October 29, 1969, UCLA Professor Leonard Kleinrock, assisted by
programmer Charley Kline, sent the first “host-to-host” message over the
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANet) ever recorded.1
The ARPANet, a precursor to the Internet whose simple network included
only a handful of universities, carried the message from UCLA to Stanford
Research Institute.2 The first message read, “lo.”3 About an hour later, the
second message read “login.”4 Fast-forward fifty years to 2019, the ARPANet has been replaced by the Internet, hosts 3.7 billion users, and boasts
an estimated 6.35 billion indexed web pages.5 Google alone processes more
than 40,000 transmissions per second.6 The modern Internet has evolved
from its humble beginnings as a small series of interconnected computers, to
a massive global network comprised of hundreds of thousands of networks
across the world.7
The Internet has become “a catalyst of innovation,” not only creating
its own industry but also igniting change and expansion in others.8 One industry which has experienced particular growth and change as a result has

1. Leonard Kleinrock, History of Communications, IEEE COMM. MAG., Aug. 2010, at 26,
32.
2. Id. at 26, 32.
3. Id. at 32.
4. 45 Years Ago: First Message Sent over the Internet, CBS NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014, 12:55
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/first-message-sent-over-the-internet-45-years-ago/ [https://
perma.cc/AU6G-2XSL].
5. Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyoneshould-read/#3268714760ba [https://perma.cc/4R45-V2YD]; The Size of the World Wide Web (The
Internet), WORLDWIDEWEBSIZE.COM, https://www.worldwidewebsize.com [https://perma.cc
/A8Q9-2BUJ].
6. Marr, supra note 5.
7. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Internet History, INT’L J. OF TECHNOETHICS, Apr.–June 2011,
at 45, 57–58.
8. Lynn St. Amour, The Internet: An Unprecedented and Unapparelled Platform for Innovation and Change, 157 (Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012); Derek Slater & Patricia Wruuk, We Are All
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been the entertainment industry.9 With the introduction of online video
streaming, modern consumers are abandoning traditional methods of film
and television consumption for an online experience they can customize to
match their taste, viewing schedule, and bank account.10 Popularly labeled
“cord cutters,” these modern consumers are swapping out their cable and
satellite contracts for accounts with subscription-based online streaming providers such as Netflix or Hulu.11 Much like cable began to replace free
broadcast as the preferred method of television consumption starting in the
1950s, online streaming services are now taking over as viewers choose to
log in instead of tune in.12
The technology necessary to facilitate this change in media consumption was first made available in 2007, when Netflix released its streaming
service.13 However, the dramatic increase in online streaming has been more
recent.14 While this upward trend can be partially explained by increased
audience familiarity with online streaming technology and increased access
to the Internet, there are other factors that come in to play.15 One such factor
is the perceived relative advantage of streaming content online.16 The relative advantage of an innovation is “the degree to which [it] is perceived as

Content Creators Now: Measuring Creativity and Innovation in the Digital Economy, 163
(Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012).
9. Derek Slater & Patricia Wruuk, We Are All Content Creators Now: Measuring Creativity
and Innovation in the Digital Economy, 163 (Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012).
10. See Arne Alsin, The Future of Media: Disruptions, Revolutions and The Quest for Distribution, FORBES (July 19, 2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aalsin/2018/07/19/thefuture-of-media-disruptions-revolutions-and-the-quest-for-distribution/#14043fab60b9 [https://
perma.cc/66JE-T548].
11. Alec Tefertiller, Media Substitution in Cable Cord-Cutting: The Adoption of WebStreaming Television, 62 J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 390, 390 (2018).
12. History of Cable, CAL. CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS’N, https://www.calcable.org/learn
/history-of-cable/ [https://perma.cc/W2LA-A4UA].
13. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 402.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 402–03.
16. Id. at 401–03.
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better than the idea it supersedes.”17 In a study into the cord-cutting phenomenon published in 2018, researchers found that consumers perceive
online video streaming as more advantageous than traditional methods of
viewing television, preferring a television viewing experience that “mirror[s]” their general user experience online.18 Thus, viewers want to play an
active role in choosing and streaming the content they watch, and want the
opportunity to stay online to connect with friends while doing so.19
The entertainment industry’s evolution is attributable to an unrestricted
Internet that facilitates competition, innovation, and growth.20 Often described as an “open architecture,” the Internet allows users to freely communicate with each other globally.21 This freedom “has opened markets beyond the traditional geographic limitations,” and allowed start-ups like
Spotify and YouTube to enter their respective markets and scale globally.22
Unfortunately, this “open Internet” may soon become a relic of the past.23
In 2017, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)24 voted to
pass the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIFO).25 RIFO eliminated the
restrictions on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that the FCC put in place in

17. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 15 (4th ed. 1995) (explaining that
this factor, when measured in the general public, may be used to predict the rate at which an innovation will be adopted).
18. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 396, 398–400, 403.
19. Id. at 403.
20. Florian Schaub, The Implications of the FCC’s Net Neutrality Repeal, 6 COGITATIO
PRESS 69, 69 (2018).
21. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium: The
Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age, at 3 (Feb. 8,
2004).
22. Id.
23. Schaub, supra note 20, at 71.
24. About the FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview [https://perma.cc/NN6Y-T68M]
(describing the FCC as “[a]n independent U.S. government agency overseen by Congress, the Commission is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing America’s communications law and regulations.”).
25. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 311, 531 (2018).
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2015 and reclassified the Internet under Title I.26 The restrictions prohibited
ISPs from “blocking, throttling, and [engaging in] prepaid-prioritization,”
and worked to preserve the Internet as an open and non-discriminatory resource accessible by all; a concept captured by the term “net neutrality”
coined by Columbia law professor, Tim Wu.27 Blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization are all ways in which an ISP may restrict consumer access to
content online. If an ISP blocks content, for example, a consumer generally
is unable to access it.28 If, instead, an ISP throttles a website, the website
will still be accessible by consumers but will take much longer to load.29
ISPs may use throttling to profit through paid prioritization agreements.30 A
content provider who enters into a paid prioritization agreement with an ISP
agrees to pay the ISP a fee to increase the speed at which consumers are able
to access the content provider’s website.31 The FCC’s restrictions on these
behaviors, which were adopted to preserve the Internet’s open architecture
and encourage innovation, have officially been removed.32
By eliminating these restrictions and thereby repealing net neutrality,
the FCC has placed the future of the Internet into the hands of ISPs.33 With
ISPs possessing concentrated power over the Internet’s distribution, control
over consumers’ ability to access content online falls into the hands of a few
26. Id. at 318, 466–67, 495.
27. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5627, 5647 (2015);
Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
141, 145 (2003).
28. Daphne Keller, A Glossary of Internet Content Blocking Tools, CENTER FOR INTERNET
AND SOCY, (Jan. 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2018/01/glossary-internetcontent-blocking-tools [https://perma.cc/C3FP-DEW6].
29. Tim Fisher, What Is Bandwidth?, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com
/what-is-bandwidth-2625809 [https://perma.cc/2V67-FJSW].
30. Katherine Trendacosta, Busting Two Myths About Pair Prioritization, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/busting-two-mythsabout-paid-prioritization [https://perma.cc/KM7S-8UJQ].
31. Id.
32. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5618–34; Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 411 (2018) (describing how the Internet’s reclassification under Title I removed the FCC’s “statutory authority to impose market-wide prophylactic regulation[s]” on to ISPs).
33. Schaub, supra note 20, at 70.
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major corporations.34 What Net Neutrality’s repeal will mean for the entertainment industry is unknown at this time.35 While proponents of RIFO argue that the Internet’s deregulation will encourage investment into broadband services, thus creating jobs and encouraging innovation,36 this outlook
seems overly optimistic.
As the number of consumers online continues to increase, upgrades to
the Internet’s infrastructure are inevitable.37 Growing interest in nationwide
Internet services require ISPs to expand their infrastructure into rural areas.38
Those in favor of Net Neutrality’s abolishment argue that ISPs will lack an
incentive to engage in such expansion if unable to charge websites prioritization fees.39 However, this argument fails to consider that ISPs lack the
financial incentive to service rural areas in the first place.40 As of 2016, ap-

34. There are three tiers into which ISPs are divided. Tier three houses companies like
Comcast that provide Internet services directly to consumers and businesses, referred to as endusers, in exchange for a fee. Tier two houses ISPs which are “specialized in data transmission,
such as routers.” Tier one (also referred to as level one) is comprised of the ISPs which, through
their creation of the Internet’s physical infrastructure, form the “backbone” of the Internet on which
all other ISPs rely. MARK WINTHER, TIER 1 ISPS: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY THEY ARE
IMPORTANT 1, 4–5 (2006). Given the prohibitively high cost of installing this infrastructure, there
are financial barriers to entry which limit the number of providers offering these services. Margil
A. Vanberg, Internet Regulation: Monopolist Bottlenecks in Internet Service Markets?, 1, 2, 19,
21–22 (June 2003).
35. Francis Dinha, Reflecting on One Year Without Net Neutrality, FORBES (June 25, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/06/25/reflecting-on-one-year-without-netneutrality/#46f015374edc [https://perma.cc/86JB-F3BK].
36. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 529, 530 (2018) (Chairman Ajit Pai
describing how the Internet’s classification and regulation under Title II has “impeded innovation”
and reduced investment into the expansion of Internet services which, in turn, resulted in fewer
jobs); see also Schaub, supra note 20, at 70.
37. Hsing Kenneth Cheng et al., The Debate on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective, 22
INFO. SYSTEMS RES. 1, 4 (2011).
38. See id. at 2, 4.
39. Id.
40. See Marguerite Reardon, Why Rural Areas Can’t Catch a Break on Speedy Broadband,
CNET (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-rural-areas-cant-catch-a-break-onspeedy-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/8S6W-YV5X].
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proximately thirty-nine percent of individuals living in rural areas lacked internet access.41 Creating the infrastructure necessary to service individuals
living in rural areas is prohibitively expensive, and once it is created, the
number of consumers who will pay to access it could be relatively few.42 In
essence, hoping that ISPs will choose to invest some of the revenue they
generate through prioritization agreements into the expansion of Internet services to rural areas, when they lack a financial incentive to do so, appears
misguided.43
ISPs possess a financial incentive to use their newfound abilities to discriminate against, prioritize, and prohibit access to content at the cost of innovation.44 RIFO does not prevent ISPs from creating hierarchies of content
prioritization based on the amount that each streaming service is able to pay,
while creating separate payment hierarchies for consumers that will determine their ability to access these sites.45 This enables ISPs to “charge twice
for the same service: their subscribers for Internet access and content providers for making sure that their data actually reaches the ISP’s subscribers.”46
Furthermore, ISPs who offer their own online streaming services have
a financial incentive to make it easier for consumers to access content on the
platforms they own, directing their customers away from competing services.47 Through the acquisition of content providers like NBC Universal
and Time Warner, ISPs are beginning to enter the content production business.48 By offering their subscribers lower access fees, ISPs will entice consumers to use their streaming service instead of services owned by a competitor.49 In addition, ISPs will dissuade financially-strapped start-ups from
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 70.
47. Id. at 71.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 70–71.
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entering the online streaming market.50 This, in turn, will stifle innovation
and reduce content diversity, allowing the largest and most financiallyequipped companies to maintain the most market control.51 Ultimately, consumers may find that they no longer play an active role in their media consumption,52 with their streaming preferences taking a back seat to the priorities of their ISP.
This Article identifies and analyzes the potential consequences of Net
Neutrality’s repeal on one of California’s most iconic industries: entertainment. Taking into account the current state of Internet regulation, this Note
examines and explores the ways in which ISPs’ newfound ability to block,
throttle, and prioritize content could impact online streaming services and
consumers. Specifically, this Article argues that ISPs have the motivation
and means to create financial barriers to entry into the online streaming service market using their control over content access.53 These barriers will
limit market entry by start-ups, which will stifle innovation and growth in
the entertainment industry as a whole, where online streaming has become
the preferred method of media consumption.54 As stated by former FCC
Chairman, Michael K. Powell: “Internet Freedom . . . promotes innovation
by giving developers and service providers confidence that they can develop
broadband applications that reach consumers and run as designed.”55 With
this freedom now compromised, a solution must be found.
Part II of this Note retraces the evolution of the Internet from the time
of its formation to the modern day, and the various regulatory frameworks
which have accompanied its growth. Part III will discuss the potential con-

50. Id.
51. See Jenny Odegard, What Net Neutrality Changes Could Mean For Your Small Business, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 4:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennyodegard/2017/12/04
/what-net-neutrality-changes-could-mean-for-your-small-business/#528ccb1056a1
[https://
perma.cc/T34D-7BL3].
52. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 403.
53. See, e,g., Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71 (describing how ISPs have historically,
“abus[ed] their powerful position as mediators between content (or edge) providers and consumers,” and are likely to continue to do so after Net Neutrality’s repeal by entering into expensive
prioritization agreements with content providers that smaller providers may have difficulty paying).
54. See id. at 70–71.
55. Powell, supra note 21, at 6.
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sequences of the non-neutral net on the entertainment industry, with a specific focus on how online streaming services could be affected by blocking,
throttling, and paid prioritization efforts by ISPs. Part IV explores the efforts
of states and private organizations in overturning or otherwise avoiding the
implications of Net Neutrality’s repeal. This Section offers various alternative solutions that may be available in the absence of protective legislation.
Part V concludes this Note with a call to action, encouraging all who care
about the future of an open and unrestricted net to no longer stand idle.

II. BACKGROUND
This Section provides a timeline of the Internet’s growth and regulation. Beginning with the 1934 Communications Act, this Section will detail
the FCC’s creation and its jurisdiction over communications services. Following an introduction to the ARPANet, and its first successful transmission
in 1969, this Section examines the FCC orders, congressional acts, and court
cases which have contributed the Internet’s expansion.

A. Creation of the FCC and Initial Classifications of Computer
Services
The FCC was created by Congress in the 1934 Communications Act
(the “1934 Act”).56 The 1934 Act placed “communication by wire,” which
at this time included telephone and telegraph services, under the FCC’s purview.57 The 1934 Act represented two significant changes in the way communication by wire had previously been regulated. First, by transferring authority over the telephone and telegraph industries to the FCC, the 1934 Act
took away the regulatory control over these industries that states had enjoyed

56. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2019).
57. Roger Heinrich, Federal Radio Commission, MIDDLE TENN. ST. U., https://
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/809/federal-radio-commission [https://perma.cc/A36DGL8J].
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prior to 1934.58 Second, by classifying radio communication and communication by wire under separate titles, the 1934 Act seemingly created a distinction between these two communication services.59
The 1934 Act is divided into multiple titles.60 The first, Title I, grants
the FCC general jurisdiction to regulate certain communications industries.61
Title I also gives the FCC ancillary jurisdiction to “make available . . . to all
the people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service,” and “perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”62 Title I ancillary jurisdiction allows
the FCC to “promulgate regulations to effectuate the goals and provisions of
the Act even in the absence of an explicit grant of regulatory authority, if the
regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s specific statutory
powers and responsibilities.”63 Thus, under certain circumstances, the FCC
may use its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I to increase its limited regulatory authority over Title I communications services.64
Title II of the 1934 Act details the FCC’s power to regulate telecommunications services.65 Providers of these services, “common carriers,”66
include “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or

58. See DIANE S. KATZ & DR. THEODORE BOLENA, CROSSED LINES: REGULATORY
MISSTEPS IN TELECOM POLICY at 2 (2003).
59. See generally Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201 (2019) (placing
telecommunications regulations under the “Title II—Common Carriers” heading, and placing radio
communications regulations under the “Title III—Provisions Related To Radio” heading).
60. Id.
61. Id. In 1934, the FCC’s jurisdiction extended over the telecommunications and radio
communications industries. The FCC’s jurisdiction under the 1934 Act has since expanded to encompass new advancements in communications technologies such as cable television and Internet
services.
62. Id.; § 154(i).
63. American Library Ass’n. v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
64. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2019).
66. Id.
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foreign communication by wire or radio or . . . [the] foreign radio transmission of energy,” but not “radio broadcasting.”67 Classification of a service
provider as a common carrier under Title II gives the FCC “express and expansive authority” to regulate the provider.68 When a service provider is
classified under Title II, the provider must comply with “such rules and regulations” as the Commission deems necessary to advance the “public interest” in receiving the service.69 By definition, the 1934 Act made Title II
applicable only to telecommunications carriers, or more specifically, AT&T
who possessed widespread market control over the telecommunications industry at the time.70 Thus, in providing the FCC with substantial regulatory
authority under Title II, Congress ensured that the Commission would be
capable of creating regulations that would make sure telecommunications
services, like that offered by AT&T, were accessible by all.71
The 1934 Act serves as an early example of the Federal Government’s
push to exercise control over communication technologies. This control
would be tested as these technologies continued to expand with new innovations.72 Following the first transmission in 1969 over the Internet’s precursor, ARPANet, the FCC was presented with a new form of communications
services not previously encountered: those facilitated via computers.73 In
response, the FCC produced the Computer Inquiries, a series of decisions
beginning in 1970 which sought to classify computer services under Title I
and II of the 1934 Act.74 In its first decision, Computer Inquiries I, the FCC

67. Id. § 153(11).
68. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
69. See 47 U.S.C. § 201.
70. See Katz & Bolena, supra note 58, at 7–9.
71. See id. at 8.
72. See, e.g., Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 173–74, 181–83 (2003) (describing how technological advancements in computer processing raised questions as to the classification of these advancements under the 1934 Act, ultimately requiring that the FCC define and redefine various aspects of
computer processing to fit under either Title I or Title II).
73. Id. at 167, 170–73.
74. Id. at 173–74.
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faced a predicament.75 AT&T was utilizing computers to facilitate data processing in connection with the basic communication services they offered at
the time.76 Here, the new service being offered, data processing, was unregulated but dependent on the heavily regulated provision of telecommunications services.77 The FCC took action by creating a distinction between computers, which “facilitated the operation of the communications network and
. . . computers with which humans interacted.”78 The level of regulation to
be applied and the common carrier participation in data processing were both
topics at the heart of the FCC’s classification debate.79 Ultimately, the FCC
found that “[t]he pure data processing market was . . . an innovative, competitive market with low barriers to entry and little chance of monopolization.”80 Thus, the Commission determined that the data processing market
did not require safeguards to prevent unfair competition.81 The same could
not be said of computers used purely to facilitate communications which the
FCC found to be susceptible to monopolistic behavior and necessitating regulation.82
In 1972, the first public demonstration of the ARPANet increased public interest in this new technology.83 Although the ARPANet was originally
intended only to facilitate resource-sharing, its messaging capabilities began
exploiting the creation of electronic mail (now referred to as e-mail).84 This
new innovation sparked the interest of thousands of consumers and became

75. Id. at 170, 173.
76. Id. at 174–75.
77. Id. at 180–81.
78. Id. at 173.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 175.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON,
OF THE INTERNET) 185–86 (1st ed. 1996).
84. Id. at 189.

WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE (THE ORIGINS
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a driving force behind the ARPANet’s expansion.85 This growth presented
new questions not accounted for by the FCC in Computer Inquiries I.86 The
delineation between computers that “facilitated the operation of the communications network and . . . computers with which humans interacted,” set
forth in Computer Inquiries I, was unsustainable.87 Each hybrid service created required a case-by-case analysis by the FCC to determine its classification, which became burdensome considering the new developments on the
rise.88
As a result, in 1976, the FCC returned to the drawing board and in its
second decision, Computer Inquiries II, the FCC once again sought to classify computers based on their functions.89 This time, the agency drew a line
between the “basic” transmission services offered by telecommunications
providers, which were subject to greater regulations, and the “enhanced” services offered by computer processing, which would be subject to less regulation.90 Basic transmission services move information from one place to
another, unaltered.91 The services, which include computer processing and
memory storage, do not interact with “user supplied information.”92 By contrast, enhanced services, including data processing, are those computer services that take a basic service and use it to alter the information being transmitted.93 Put simply, “what goes into the network is different than what
comes out of the network.”94 In its analysis, the FCC expressed that the
public’s best interest would be served by allowing data processing services

85. Id.
86. Cannon, supra note 72, at 181–82.
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id. at 181.
89. Id.
90. See generally id. at 183–88.
91. Id. at 183–84.
92. Id. at 183.
93. Id. at 185–86.
94. Id. at 186 (citation omitted).
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to continue flourishing in the open, competitive market without regulatory
interference.95

B. Expansion of the ARPANet
The FCC’s prediction turned out to be valid, with the deregulation of
the data processing services encouraging the early Internet’s continued expansion.96 As the budding Internet continued to grow, changes to its transmission architecture were required to accommodate the increased number of
networks hosted.97 In the early 1970s, the ARPANet was joined by other
networks such as the Atlantic Packet Satellite Network (SATNet).98 The
Network Control Protocol (NCP), which the ARPANet relied on to transmit
information, was designed to only meet the specifications of the ARPANet’s
network.99 It was incompatible with other networks that “had different interfaces, different maximum packet sizes, and different transmission
rates.”100 This limited the ARPANet’s connectivity across networks.101 Beginning in 1983, the ARPANet migrated from the NCP to the new and improved Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP).102
This protocol migration represents a tremendous milestone in the Internet’s

95. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 9 (FCC, Working Paper
No. 31, 1999).
96. Id. at 11–12 (describing how the FCC’s decision not to regulate data processing services
transmitted over telecommunications lines resulted in the early internet’s “explosive growth”).
97. Id.
98. Hafner & Lyon, supra note 83, at 221, 222–23.
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 248. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which focused only on transmitting information (referred to as packets) from one user to another, was delivered in 1973. The
TCP increased network reliability by creating a transmission framework focused on moving packets from one user to another without deciphering the information itself. Five years later, the portion
of TCP dedicated to routing packets was separated into its own protocol, the Internet Protocol (IP).
Under this new system, TCP would be responsible for, “breaking up messages into datagrams . . .
detecting errors, resending anything that got lost,” and ensuring the information was in the right
order, while IP was “responsible for routing individual diagrams.” Id. at 226–27, 236.
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history.103 In their book, Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the
Internet, Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyons describe this event as follows:
Without TCP, communication across networks couldn’t happen.
If TCP could be perfected, anyone could build a network of any
size or form, and as long as that network had a gateway computer
that could interpret and route packets, it could communicate with
any other network. With TCP on the horizon, it was now obvious
that networking had a future well beyond the experimental
ARPANet.104
As the ARPANet continued to expand, so did concerns that this market
may fall victim to the stifling effects of concentrated control.105 In United
States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, the court addressed
whether an antitrust consent decree requiring AT&T’s divestiture should be
entered given the provider’s widespread control over the telecommunications industry and its use of this power to disadvantage competitors.106 Here,
the court recognized the FCC’s delineation between basic and enhanced services set-forth in Computer Inquiries II.107 At the heart of this case was the
concern that AT&T would use its concentrated power over the distribution
of telecommunications services to monopolize the computer and computerrelated information markets.108 Ultimately, the court entered a modified antitrust consent decree, finding the divestiture of AT&T to be in the public
interest by promoting competition in the “growing computer, computer-related, and information markets.”109

103. Id. at 249.
104. Id. at 227.
105. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 171 (D.D.C.
1982) (describing AT&T’s control over the interexchange market which is also known and referred
to as the telecommunications market).
106. Id. at 135, 223.
107. Id. at 138 n.17.
108. Id. at 179.
109. Id. at 223, 226–27.
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By 1984, the Internet hosted 1,024 computers, and academic interest in
the ARPANet was on the rise.110 The open architecture of the ARPANet
allowed anyone to connect to its network with no “special accommodations”
required.111 During its initial growth, the ARPANet’s development was
funded by the United States government.112 However, as civilian interest
grew, so did budgetary constraints, so the government began engaging with
private companies to take over.113 By 1993, the Federal Networking Council, comprised of various government agencies involved in networking, selected the National Science Foundation (NSF) to “assume responsibilities for
non-military Internet registration.”114 NSF awarded a five-year contract to
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) to handle the registration process.115 This registration process involved associating domain names (a human-readable
character string such as nsf.gov) with an Internet Protocol (IP) address (used
by computers to locate other computers).116 The Domain Name System
(DNS) allowed users to “send and receive messages and to access information from computers anywhere on the Internet.”117 By September 1998,
over two million registered domain names existed.118 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Numbers and Names (ICANN) entered into an agreement

110. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 7, at 51.
111. Id. at 51. By 1987, the number of computers hosted by the ARPANet had grown to
10,000 and networks created by various organizations such as the National Science Foundation
(NSFNet) began merging to facilitate the traffic. Over the three years which followed, the World
Wide Web (WWW), an international system of protocols allowing users to identify resources online
using Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), had been developed along with most communications
software. Id. at 52–53.
112. Id. at 46–47.
113. Id. at 52.
114. A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2003), https://
www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050 [https://perma.cc/V4D3-LX4H].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. LENNARD G. KRUGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-868, INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES:
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES (2015).
118. See A History of NSF and the Internet, supra note 114.
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with the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration to oversee domain name registration, and the Internet as we know it today, was born.119

C. The 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Reclassification of the
Internet
By 1996, it was time for Congress to revisit the Internet’s classification.120 The 1996 Telecommunications Act (the “1996 Act”), intending to
“promote competition and reduce regulation,” drew a new line, this time between “information services” (including the Internet), and heavily regulated
“telecommunications services.”121 Telecommunications services transmit
information from one place to another “without change in the form or content
of the information as sent and received.”122 Information Services, on the
other hand, include “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information . . . .”123 Congress found that limited regulatory interference had
resulted in the Internet’s expansion, to the benefit of all.124 During the years
which followed the adoption of the 1996 Act, the FCC took a “light-touch”
approach to regulating the Internet, veering away from the large scale regulation of ISPs.125 The FCC’s 1998 Stevens Report endorsed Congress’s classification of the Internet as an information service, and the Commissions
2002 Cable Modem Order classified Internet services transmitted via cable
systems as “interstate information service[s].”126

119. Id.
120. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996) (codifying Congress’s reclassification of the Internet as an information service).
121. Id.; 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(24), (53) (2019).
122. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50).
123. Id. § 153(24).
124. Id. § 230(a)(4).
125. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 314 (2018).
126. High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 4798,
4802 (2002); Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 F.C.C. Rcd. 11501, 11536 (1998); Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000 (2005).
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While the FCC was prepared to classify Internet services transmitted
via cable systems as information services, the Ninth Circuit was not.127 In
its review of the 2002 Cable Modem Order in American Telecommunications
& Telegraph Corporation v. Portland (“Portland”), the Ninth Circuit declined to recognize Internet services, when transmitted over “cable broadband facilities,” as information services.128 Instead, the court found that because the 1996 Act defined cable broadband transmission as a
telecommunications service, Internet services, when transmitted over cable
systems, should be classified the same.129 This reasoning formed the basis
for the Ninth Circuit’s declaratory ruling on the subject two years later where
it found that “the Commission could not permissibly construe the 1996 Act
to exempt cable companies providing cable modem service from mandatory
Title II regulation.”130
In its review of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services (“Brand X”) disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Portland.131
The Court held that the Ninth Circuit “erred in refusing to apply” the correct
framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel (“Chevron”) when analyzing the Commission’s classification.132
The Chevron framework “requires a federal court to defer to an agency’s
construction, even if it differs from what the court believes to be the best
interpretation, if the particular statute is within the agency’s jurisdiction to
administer, the statute is ambiguous on the point at issue, and the agency’s
construction is reasonable.”133 Here, the Brand X Court found that because
127. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the
transmission of Internet service to subscribers over cable broadband facilities is a telecommunications service under the Communications Act.”).
128. Id. at 878.
129. See id. at 877–78.
130. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 968.
131. Id. at 996.
132. Id. at 981–82, 984; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (summarizing the two-part Chevron framework utilized by the Supreme
Court in this case to address the deference owed to a federal agency where the agency’s construction
of a federal statute is at issue).
133. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 969 (citation omitted).
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the 1996 Act “fails unambiguously to classify non-facilities-based information-service providers that use telecommunications inputs to provide an
information service,” the classification of Internet services transmitted over
cable systems fell under the FCC’s purview.134 Furthermore, given the inseparability of the telecommunication and information-service aspects of cable broadband transmission, the Court found that the FCC’s classification of
this communications technology as an information service was reasonable.135
In 2004, the then-chairman of the FCC, Michael K. Powell, described
four principles essential to maintaining the Internet’s open architecture.136
These four principles include the freedom to access content, freedom to use
applications, freedom to attach personal devices, and the freedom to obtain
service plan information.137 Powell emphasized that “ensuring that consumers can obtain and use the content, applications and devices they want – is
critical to unlocking the vast potential of the broadband Internet.”138 In 2005,
these freedoms were adopted by the FCC, and over the next two years, the
Commission continued to expand the definition of information services set
out in the 1996 Act to include wireless broadband Internet services and the
transmission of Internet services over powerlines.139 By classifying these
forms of Internet distribution as information services, the FCC ensured that
they would be subject to the lighter regulatory schema set out by the 1996
Act, and that local regulations to the contrary would be preempted.140 At the
time, both Congress and the FCC believed that minimal regulation promoted
maximum growth.141

134. Id. at 996–97.
135. Id. at 997.
136. Michael K. Powell, supra note 21, at 5.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless
Networks, 22 F.C.C. Rcd. 5901, 5909–10 (2007); United Power Line Councils Petition for Declaratory Ruling, 21 F.C.C. Rcd. 13281, 13285 (2006).
140. 47 U.S.C. §§ 234(a)(4), (b)(2), 253(a), (d) (2019).
141. Id. § 234(b)(1)–(b)(2).
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D. Preservation of the Internet’s Open Architecture Calls for
Increased Regulation
In 2008, the FCC found that Comcast, an Internet services provider,
violated two of the four Internet freedoms proffered by Powell that the Commission adopted in its Internet Policy Statement, namely the freedom to access content and the freedom to use applications.142 An investigation
launched by the Associated Press determined that Comcast “actively interfer[ed] with attempts by some of its high-speed Internet subscribers to share
files online,” in some cases blocking sharing altogether.143 This conduct was
specifically directed at subscribers utilizing BitTorrent, a service which had
become a competitive threat to cable companies such as Comcast.144 BitTorrent allowed users to view videos online that they would otherwise pay
to watch on cable.145 This order served as one of the first instances in which
the FCC attempted to regulate the behavior of ISP’s “traffic management”
practices in the interest of equal access by users.146 The Commission ultimately found that Comcast’s conduct was unreasonable, “invasive and outright discriminatory.”147
Although the Supreme Court in Brand X specifically rejected that Title
II vested the FCC with regulatory jurisdiction over ISPs, the Commission
claimed its authority over Comcast derived from its “ancillary jurisdiction to
regulate interstate and foreign communications” under Title I of the 1934

142. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.
Rcd. 13028, 13034, 13050–52 (2008).
143. Id. at 13031.
144. Id. at 13030.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 13045–46.
147. Id. at 13051, 13059.
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Act.148 Because the FCC considered the “peer-to-peer TCP connections”149
provided by Comcast to constitute a form of communication by wire, the
Commission found that Comcast’s conduct fell under the FCC’s jurisdiction.150 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed
with the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction argument and vacated the FCC’s 2002
Cable Modem Order two years later in Comcast Corporation v. Federal
Communications Commission (“Comcast”).151 The court found that the
Commission’s basis for ancillary jurisdiction over Comcast rested on policy
reasons alone and thus, the FCC failed to support that exercising jurisdiction
over Comcast was “reasonably ancillary” to the agency’s effective performance of “statutorily mandated responsibilities.”152
In response to the appellate court’s decision, the FCC issued the 2010
Open Internet Order.153 This Order relied on Section 706 of the 1996 Act
which employed the FCC and state governments to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . .”154 In its Order, the Commission sought to
protect the freedoms set-forth in the Internet Policy Statement by requiring
ISPs to publicly disclose their management practices and prohibiting them
148. Id. at 13034–36; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 976 (2005); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169–70, 172, 178
(1968) (holding that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction extended the agency’s regulatory control over
cable television); Christopher J. Wright, The Scope of the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction After the
D.C. Circuit’s Net Neutrality Decisions, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 19, 24 (2015).
149. A peer-to-peer (P2P) network allows users to share content with each other directly.
P2P, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/p2p [https://perma.cc/K6A6-3QJR] (explaining that “[i]n a P2P network, the “peers” are computer systems which are connected to each other
via the Internet and files can be shared directly between systems on the network without the need
of a central server.”).
150. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23
F.C.C. Rcd. at 13035.
151. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
152. Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
153. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905
(2010).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 706 (1997). While this section has been codified as § 1302, it is commonly
referred to as § 706 as it appeared in the initial, uncodified version of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States Telecomm. Ass’n v.
FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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from blocking lawful websites.155 Through the creation of “narrowly tailored” rules, the FCC sought to preserve the open architecture of the Internet
with the idea that this openness would encourage innovation and its continued development.156 Again, the FCC was met with opposition by the D.C.
Circuit Court.157 In 2014, the court rejected the FCC’s blocking restrictions
in Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission, finding the restrictions
too closely resembled the regulations imposed on Title II telecommunication
services and thus, were outside of the FCC’s authority when applied to information services.158 The court did, however, uphold the disclosure requirement.159
Following Verizon, it became clear that the separation of information
and telecommunication services, which once served to further the FCC’s
goal of encouraging the Internet’s growth, was becoming a roadblock to regulations necessary for consumer protection.160 Where at one time, the growth
of this industry was most threatened by government interference, government action was now necessary to prevent monopolization and restriction of
public access.161 In November 2014, then-president Barack Obama appealed
to the FCC, stating: “I believe the FCC should reclassify consumer broadband service under Title II of the Telecommunications Act,” the same section which houses the regulations imposed on the telecommunications industry.162 President Obama believed reclassification would allow for “the
strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality.”163
155. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18019, ¶
9.
156. Id. at 17984–85, ¶¶ 145, 148.
157. See generally Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
158. Id. at 655–56.
159. Id. at 659.
160. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. at 17965, ¶
112.
161. Id.
162. Statement by the President on Net Neutrality, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/10/statement-president-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/ZJX3-GWL2].
163. Id.
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Soon after, the FCC responded to President Obama’s request with a
second Open Internet Order (referred to as the “2015 Open Internet Order”)
which reclassified “broadband Internet access service” from an information
service to a telecommunications service.164 The FCC’s authority to reclassify the Internet in this way rested on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand
X, requiring deference to classification decisions by federal agencies where
the statute at issue is ambiguous.165 This reclassification allowed the FCC to
impose the blocking, throttling, and prioritization restrictions on ISPs that
the Commission had originally proposed in the 2010 Open Internet Order.166
Two years later, the 2015 Open Internet Order was upheld by a divided D.C.
Circuit Court in United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission.167 Here, the Commission argued “that although broadband often relies on certain information services to transmit content to end
users, these services ‘do not turn broadband Internet access service into a
functionally integrated information service’ because ‘they fall within the telecommunications system management exception.’”168 The Commission
pointed to DNS and caching,169 two information services thought to be essential to Internet use at the time, as falling under this exception.170 The FCC
explained that DNS and caching only helped facilitate user access to other
services online and thus, were not so essential to Internet transmission that
the classification of broadband Internet services as information services
should be required.171

164. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5615 (2015).
165. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996–97
(2005).
166. Jacob Kastrenakes, The FCC Just Killed Net Neutrality, THE VERGE (Dec. 14, 2017,
1:12 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/14/16776154/fcc-net-neutrality-vote-results-rulesrepealed [https://perma.cc/TED2-7TVB].
167. United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
168. Id. at 699 (quoting Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at
5765).
169. See infra Section IV for a more detailed description of DNS and caching functionalities.
170. United States Telecomm. Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 699.
171. Id. at 699–700.
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E. The End of the Neutral Net
On December 14, 2017, the FCC voted 3-2 along party lines to pass the
Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIFO).172 This decision followed the
November 2016 election of Republican Donald Trump who joined a republican-controlled Congress.173 In early January 2017, President Trump appointed Ajit Pai to lead the FCC, replacing former chairman and Net Neutrality proponent Tom Wheeler.174 Pai took immediate action to repeal the
restrictions on ISP blocking, throttling, and prioritization behaviors set forth
in the 2015 Open Internet Order.175 In describing the motivation behind
RIFO, the FCC claimed the Order would create “a favorable climate for network investment . . ., spurring competition and innovation that benefits consumers.”176 However, the FCC failed to consider the fact that competition
amongst ISPs is largely illusory.177
A competitive market requires that consumers have access to three or
more options when choosing service providers.178 “In wireless, for instance,
the FCC and DOJ have repeatedly shot down mergers that would result in

172. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 311 (2018). This Order was later
upheld, subject to modifications, by the D.C. Circuit Court in October, 2019. Mozilla Corp. v.
FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
173. Julian Boger, Democrats Fail to Retake Control of the Senate After Big Losses on
Election Night, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov
/08/us-congress-election-results-senate-house-democrats-republicans
[https://perma.cc/K3AGL57E].
174. Shawn Knight, Ajit Pai to Replace Tom Wheeler as Head of the FCC, TECHSPOT (Jan.
24, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.techspot.com/news/67880-ajit-pai-replace-tom-wheeler-headfcc.html [https://perma.cc/HDF5-UKBX].
175. See Bio of Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/leadership/ajitpai#bio [https://perma.cc/U8ZP-8AAX].
176. Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, FCC Acts to Restore Internet Freedom (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-takes-action-restore-Internet-freedom [https://perma.cc
/7536-YZYD].
177. Sascha Segan, Exclusive: Check Out the Terrible State of US ISP Competition, PC
MAG (Dec. 15, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/news/357972/exclusive-data-showsthe-terrible-state-of-us-isp-competitio [https://perma.cc/P3WP-FGGX].
178. Id.
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fewer than four nationwide carriers, for competitive reasons.”179 However,
a recent study that collected Internet speeds from consumers located in
21,511 of the United States’ 33,092 ZIP codes over five months showed that
only 30% of those consumers had three or more ISP options.180 “A freemarket approach to internet access doesn’t work if there’s no free market.”181
With so little competition between ISPs, it is hard to reconcile the FCC’s
reasoning with any projected increase in competition.182 The reason behind
the lack of competition in the ISP market is subject to debate however, one
explanation seems particularly convincing: it is simply too expensive to create the infrastructure necessary to provide Internet services.183 It is unclear
how RIFO will lessen the cost of infrastructure creation or otherwise encourage competition in the ISP market. It seems more likely that the ISPs currently in existence will benefit from the FCC’s Order while new companies
will continue to be barred by the financial cost of entry into this market.
RIFO lifted the prohibition on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization by ISPs, and reversed the Internet’s classification under Title II.184
While the 2017 Order requires that ISPs publicly disclose185 blocking, throttling, and prioritization behaviors, RIFO does not actually require that these
providers refrain from doing so.186 Thus, it appears that as long as ISPs issue
the proper disclosures, these providers are free to offer consumers a browsing experience tailored in whichever way they choose.187 By allowing ISPs
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 450 (2018).
185. Disclosure Instructions for ISPs, FCC (June 13, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/consumer-governmental-affairs/internet-service-provider-disclosures/disclosure-instructions-isps
[https://perma.cc/C3Z4-UB65] (outlining the Transparency Rule, 47 CFR § 8.1(a), which requires
Internet service providers (ISPs) to disclose information about its broadband Internet access services in one of two ways: (1) by providing it on a publicly available, easily accessible website of
its choosing or, (2) by submitting it to the FCC).
186. See id.
187. See id.
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to harbor such control over the Internet experience they provide and inform
consumers only after the fact, RIFO sets-forth a regulatory scheme that is
inherently unbalanced and violates the very principles of competition and
industrial growth which the Order claims to protect.
Although its name might suggest otherwise, RIFO does not restore Internet freedom. In fact, it appears that the 2017 Order does not even preserve
the Internet freedom which already existed. Instead, the Order restores the
Internet’s classification as a Title I information service; a categorization already deemed unsatisfactory by the 2015 Open Internet Order.188 The FCC’s
long and tumultuous history of Internet regulation met with judicial opposition sought to achieve one common purpose: to encourage the Internet’s
growth and accessibility.189 By removing restrictions on blocking, throttling,
and paid prioritization, RIFO does not achieve this purpose.190 Instead, the
2017 Order fails to take into account the rapid and expansive growth of the
Internet services industry and the evolution of regulatory framework necessary to accommodate it.191 How ISP’s financially biased tailoring of user’s
Internet experience will affect the American people in the long-term is at
best, speculative. However, a future without Net Neutrality is one in which
users will lose agency over the media they consume and their worldviews,
as accessibility online becomes a luxury only the wealthiest companies can
afford and the content available represents the preferences of these fortunate
few.

III. IMPACTS THIS REPEAL COULD HAVE ON THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY
By eliminating the safeguards which prevented ISPs from blocking,
throttling, and engaging in paid prioritization, RIFO has the ability to detrimentally impact the future of the Internet.192 If ISPs choose to engage in this

188. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5742,
¶ 328 (2015).
189. See generally Powell, supra note 21, at 1–2.
190. See Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C. Rcd. 17905,
17985 (2010) (explaining why restrictions on this behavior are essential to the Internet’s Open
Architecture).
191. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 162.
192. Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71.
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once-prohibited conduct they will be capable of not only controlling Internet
access by consumers, but also limiting the visibility of online companies.193
On both sides of the payment hierarchy, those who can pay the most will
reap the greatest benefit.194 While the entertainment industry has yet to see
major changes caused by the removal of these restrictions, to remain idle in
the hopes that ISPs will still take a consumer-friendly approach in the years
to come is “wishful thinking.”195 The online streaming service industry, with
its complete reliance on online distribution, is particularly vulnerable to ISP
discrimination.196 A payment hierarchy will disadvantage consumers and
small businesses alike by creating financial barriers to entry and allowing
“the Verizons and AT&Ts of the world . . . to determine what we watch and
what we do by charging fees based on the user, the application, the content,
[and] the platform.”197

A. Increasing Popularity of Online Video Streaming Services
With research showing that consumers want to take an active role in
their viewing experience, choosing the content they stream and connecting
with friends while doing so, online streaming services such as Netflix and
Hulu offer an ideal television experience.198 Netflix, which boasts the largest
user base of any online streaming service, reported 60.1 million United

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 70.
196. James K. Wilcox, How You’ll Know Net Neutrality Is Really Gone, CONSUMER REP.
(June 11, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/net-neutrality/end-of-net-neutrality-what-towatch-for/ [https://perma.cc/NFD6-3M7F].
197. James E. McMillan, FCC’s Worrisome Repeal of Net Neutrality Laws, L.A. LAW.,
May 2018, at 1, 36, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2018-issues/may2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5VG-3B9L].
198. Tefertiller, supra note 11, at 395, 401–03. Online streaming providers are also capable
of providing consumers with a wider variety of content options which exceeds that available on
cable. While cable providers are subject to the FCC’s “must carry,” laws requiring that they dedicate channels to broadcast local networks, online streaming providers are not restricted by such
rules. This allows online streaming providers to host a wide variety of content, making them an
even more appealing option to consumers. WINSTON MAXWELL ET AL., REGULATION IN A
DIGITAL AGE 1, 11 (2018).
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States subscribers in the second quarter of 2019.199 To put this in perspective, the highest number of cable subscriptions during any given year was
reported as being nearly 69 million in the FCC’s Eighth Annual Video Competition Report in 2001.200 The number of consumers subscribing to Netflix
alone illustrates the pervasive impact that blocking, throttling, and prioritization of content by ISPs could have on this industry.

B. The Non-Neutral Net’s Potential Consequences for Online Video
Streaming Services
To outline the ramifications that blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization by ISPs may have on consumers’ ability to access content online, a
description of these once-prohibited behaviors are provided here. Subject to
one exception,201 blocking a website makes it impossible to access.202 Throttling a website makes it more difficult to access by restricting the bandwidth
available to your computer in processing the information necessary to display content.203 Put simply, throttling makes content difficult to load.204 Paid
prioritization,205 on the other hand, translates to ISPs ability “to charge for
199. Amy Watson, Number of Netflix Paying Streaming Subscribers Worldwide from 3rd
Quarter 2011 to 2nd Quarter 2019 (in Millions), STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/250934/quarterly-number-of-netflix-streaming-subscribers-worldwide/
[https://perma.cc/CP9G-LEPA].
200. See generally FCC Adopts 8th Annual Report on Competition in Video Markets, FCC,
at 1 (Jan. 14, 2002), https://transition.fcc.gov/mb/8compnr.txt [https://perma.cc/T3YC-BU6B].
201. See generally TJ McCue, How Does A VPN Work?, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 11:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2019/06/20/how-does-a-vpn-work/#187a973b70cd
[https://perma.cc/5C6J-QRM5] (describing how users may circumvent blocking by use of a Virtual
Personal Network (VPN), which enables the user to connect to the network used by a different
server somewhere in the Internet).
202. Keller, supra note 28.
203. Tim Fisher, What Is Bandwidth?, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://
www.lifewire.com/what-is-bandwidth-2625809 [https://perma.cc/2V67-FJSW].
204. Id.
205. Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate
and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 652 (2008) (describing that to facilitate paid-prioritization
and bandwidth throttling, ISPs utilize Internet routing equipment, including “packet sniffing” technology that analyzes the contents of the packets being sent using its server, which allows ISPs to
assign priority to the information’s transmission).
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some Internet services to be sped up, while all the rest are slowed down.”206
It is also important to understand that throttling and prioritization work in
tandem.207 “Because paid prioritization is a zero-sum game, speeding up
some traffic means other traffic is, by comparison, slowed down.”208 If ISPs
choose to enter into paid prioritization contracts with streaming services who
can afford the fees, this could mean that those who refuse to do so could have
their content throttled.209 This results in a “two-tiered Internet, destroying
the web as we know it to make one preferred high-speed lane (with plenty of
tollbooths), and a dirt road for those who can’t afford to upgrade.”210 By
giving ISPs the selective power to pick and choose what content to prioritize,
the FCC has handed providers the tools to censor the Internet.211
While ISPs, as corporations, possess First Amendment rights, they do
not possess First Amendment obligations to consumers which would prevent
them from limiting consumer access.212 This means that ISPs do not owe
their consumers an objective user experience which is uninfluenced by the
agreements they enter into.213 RIFO’s proponents argue that by eliminating
Net Neutrality regulations, investment into and competition within the
206. Katherine Trendacosta, Busting Two Myths About Pair Prioritization, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/busting-two-mythsabout-paid-prioritization [https://perma.cc/KM7S-8UJQ].
207. Philip Berenbroick, House Commerce Takes On Paid Prioritization, An Essential
Tenet To The Open Internet, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (April 12, 2018), https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/house-commerce-takes-on-paid-prioritization-an-essential-tenet-to-theopen-internet/ [https://perma.cc/2HX7-VTCR].
208. Id.
209. See Schaub, supra note 20, at 70.
210. Network Neutrality and the Fight to Save the Internet: Background, NAT’L
COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP, https://ncac.org/resource/network-neutrality-and-the-fight-tosave-the-Internet-background [https://perma.cc/9FRF-YDNM].
211. See id.
212. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310, 342–43 (2010) (holding that the “government may not, under the First Amendment, suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.”); Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal
Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-companies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution [https://perma.cc/X9E3-RKAH].
213. Dr. Joel Timmer, Protecting and Infringing Free Speech? Net Neutrality and the First
Amendment, 1 F.C.L.J. 1, 11–12.
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broadband arena will increase, creating an incentive for providers to offer
“faster, better, and cheaper” Internet services to consumers.214 It has yet to
be seen whether this new and improved Internet will materialize as a result
of Net Neutrality’s repeal. However, it seems likely that with ISPs free to
engage in practices such as tiered Internet pricing, consumers will ultimately
find themselves paying more for the same level of service from online
streaming services, instead of less.215 ISPs have a financial incentive to enter
into prioritization deals with content streaming services because these deals
allow ISPs to exchange greater content accessibility for economic gain.216
ISPs also have a financial incentive to prioritize the content streaming services they own, making it easier for consumers to access provider-owned
content and directing these users away from competing services.217 These
content providers may, in turn, displace the extra cost they pay to ISPs, in
order to have their content prioritized, onto consumers through higher subscription fees.218 Thus, while consumers may be provided with a “faster,
cheaper and better”219 Internet, these costs may simply be displaced elsewhere.
While ISPs have pledged “not to block or throttle or otherwise discriminate against legal online content such as that offered by Netflix and Hulu,”
it is unclear what, if any, measures the FCC is taking to ensure this pledge is
upheld.220 Notably, this pledge does not extend to cover paid prioritization,
214. Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/restoring-internet-freedom
[https://perma.cc/V234-YMEZ].
215. James K. Wilcox, supra note 196.
216. See id.; see also Schaub, supra note 20, at 70–71.
217. Corynne McSherry et al., Zero Rating: What it is and Why You Should Care,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rating-what-it-is-why-you-should-care [https://perma.cc/7YPC-L47Q].
218. James K. Wilcox, supra note 196.
219. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 214.
220. John Eggerton, ISPs Renew Pledges Not to Block or Throttle, BROADCASTING AND
CABLE (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/isps-renew-pledges-not-blockor-throttle-170263 [https://perma.cc/VY8U-6P68]; see also Lauren C. Williams, Net Neutrality
Could Be Undermined by Lack of Penalties for ISPs that Break the Rules, THINKPROGRESS (Mar.
19, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/net-neutrality-could-be-undermined-by-lack-of-penalties-forisps-that-break-the-rules-61e5e01496c8/ [https://perma.cc/LQ9M-EGQ3?type=image] (explaining
that ambiguity in the language of the FCC’s transparency requirement results in a situation where
if ISPs are “caught throttling customers or blocking access, and the FCC imposes a $10 million
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meaning ISPs have not promised to abstain from charging online businesses
higher fees in exchange for increased accessibility by consumers.221 RIFO
requires only that ISPs who have engaged in blocking, throttling, or paid
prioritization disclose this information to their consumers “by providing it
on a publicly available, easily accessible website of [their] choosing or,” alternatively, “by submitting it to the FCC.”222 As of RIFO’s passing, power
to take action against ISPs “for anticompetitive acts or unfair and deceptive
practices” has been handed over to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).223
However, the responsibility of monitoring ISPs to ensure they are adequately
disclosing blocking, throttling, and prioritization behaviors appears to rest
largely on consumers, with the FCC encouraging users “to file informal complaints for apparent violations of the transparency rule in order to assist the
Commission in monitoring the broadband market.”224
A pay-to-play hierarchy, where content streaming services are required
to pay in order to reach consumers, could mean that the structure of the
online streaming service industry begins to model that of the cable industry
where, “if you want to start a new channel and get significant placement, you
better have a lot of money.”225 This structure, which streaming services have
rebelled against, creates a financial barrier to entry.226 Smaller streaming
services who lack the financial resources of industry giants will be unable to
out-pay these larger companies in prioritization agreements with ISPs and
thus, will be less accessible by consumers.227 As start-ups and smaller
streaming services are pushed aside by larger companies, the content most
fine, the company can argue that it wasn’t given adequate notice and duck the fine, or any other
that’s above $25,000.”).
221. Eggerton, supra note 220.
222. Disclosure Instructions for ISPs, FCC, (June 13, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/disclosure-instructions-isps [https://perma.cc/B7YX-SQ33].
223. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 214.
224. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 490 (2018).
225. Ted Johnson, What the Repeal of Net Neutrality Will Mean for Hollywood, VARIETY
(Nov. 22, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/net-neutrality-repeal-hollywood-significance-1202621436/ [https://perma.cc/X32H-PKH7].
226. See id.
227. Schaub, supra note 20, at 71.
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easily accessible online will be that provided by the wealthiest companies.228
With less streaming services able to afford the high cost of entry, innovation
in this industry will be stifled.229 The Writers Guild of America, one of Hollywood’s talent guilds, stated in response to these concerns that “without the
rules, ISPs will be free to decide what content is available to Americans and
on what terms, striking a blow to consumers and content creators alike.”230

C. The Risk of ISP Monopolies in the Online Video Streaming
Industry
Another concern is that the FCC will no longer be effective in policing
the Internet to ensure ISPs are not monopolizing the video streaming industry.231 “The FCC . . . will lose oversight over interconnection,” which occurs
when distinctive ISPs agree to share their respective Internet traffic across
networks.232 Interconnection acts as the “lifeblood of the Internet,” and the
agreement’s ISPs enter into in connection with this practice are highly consequential on consumer access.233
Online streaming services have fought interconnection before.234 In
2014, Netflix opposed the merger of companies Comcast Corporation
(“Comcast”) and Time Warner Cable, Inc., (“Warner”) the parent company
of HBO, Turner, and other major video streaming services.235 In its petition
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Johnson, supra note 225.
231. Id.
232. Id.; see generally ISP Interconnection and Its Impact on Consumer Internet Performance, MEASUREMENT LAB (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.measurementlab.net/publications/ispinterconnection-impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUF7-AFNB].
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc., Applications of Comcast Corp. and Time
Warner Cable Inc. for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Applications, No. 1457 (2014) (outlining Netflix’s opposition to the merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable, Inc.
out of concern that the merger would incentivize Comcast to make Netflix and other online streaming services not owned by Turner less accessible by consumers through the charging of fees at
interconnection points).
235. Id. at 1; WarnerMedia, AT&T, https://about.att.com/pages/company_profile_warnermedia [https://perma.cc/THA4-Z5NV].
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to deny the merger, Netflix argued that “[t]he combined entity would have
the incentive and ability—through access fees charged at interconnection
points and by other means—to harm Internet companies,” such as online
streaming services.236 ISPs like Comcast, which offer traditional cable television services in addition to Internet services, face competition from companies like Netflix, which offer online streaming services, thus ISPs are incentivized to restrict consumer access to these sites.237 In its petition, Netflix
pointed out that “[w]hile Comcast has adopted network neutrality rules for
broadband access services,” it had created a “bandwidth crisis at interconnection points,” making it more difficult for consumers to access content on
Netflix.238 In April of 2015, Comcast called off the merger “two days after
meetings between Comcast and federal regulators, who had signaled that
they were leaning toward blocking [it].”239
Three years later, in June of 2018, AT&T, the second largest provider
of Internet services in the United States, acquired Comcast and Time Warner
for 85 billion dollars.240 While the United States Government challenged the
merger in the D.C. District Court, arguing that the merger would cause “harm
to competition,” the court ultimately held that the government had “failed to
carry its burden.”241 This merger raised antitrust questions.242 While AT&T
and Warner did not offer the same services at the time of the merger, meaning they were not direct competitors, the Department of Justice (DOJ) voiced
concerns that AT&T would “use its ownership of Time Warner’s ‘must-

236. Petition to Deny of Netflix, Inc., supra note 234, at i.
237. Id. at 28.
238. Id. at 96.
239. Emily Steel, Under Regulators’ Scrutiny, Comcast and Time Warner Cable End Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/business/media/comcast-timewarner-cable-deal.html [https://perma.cc/8KB5-PAXR].
240. Daniel Hemli & Jackie Java, What the AT&T/Time Warner Decision Means for Antitrust Enforcement, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-the-at-ttime-warner-decision-48987/ [https://perma.cc/R63H-SHED].
241. United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 17-2511, 2018 WL 3752091, at *68, *74 (D.D.C.
June 12, 2018).
242. Id. at *40.
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have’ popular content to increase its bargaining leverage . . . .”243 The DOJ
feared that this bargaining leverage would allow AT&T to demand higher
fees from competing services, which would ultimately be passed on to consumers.244 The DOJ also perceived this merger as threatening to innovation,
arguing that the new entity would have the “incentive and ability to impede
the growth of online video distribution services” because it would own both
the content and the means of its distribution.245
Some of the DOJ’s concerns previously materialized with practices like
“zero-rating.”246 Zero-rating is where “ISPs like Verizon and AT&T offer
. . . consumers the ability to view some video on . . . [their] wireless plan
without it counting against their data caps, while other types of content still
do.”247 Often times, the video content subject to zero-rating is that owned
by the ISP.248 This behavior was criticized by both the Obama administration
and the FCC as giving ISP-owned services an unfair competitive advantage.249 However, under the FCC’s new leadership, the Commission has
abandoned its zero-rating investigation, with Ajit Pai arguing that zero-rating
benefits consumers by making it cheaper to access content online.250 While
practices like zero-rating could make it cheaper for consumers to access
some content, those who want to access video streaming services that are not
partnered with their ISP could end up paying a much higher cost.251 The
anti-competitive and anti-innovative effects of practices like zero-rating,

243. Hemli & Java, supra note 240 (citation omitted); see also United States v. AT&T, Inc.,
No. 17-2511, 2018 WL 3752091, at *69, *150.
244. Hemli & Java, supra note 240.
245. United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 17-2511, 2018 WL 3752091, at *165.
246. See Schaub, supra note 20, at 71.
247. See Johnson, supra note 225.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Elliot Harmon & Gennie Gebhart, FCC Abandons Zero-Rating Investigation and
Moves Backward on Net Neutrality, Electronic Frontier Foundation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/fcc-abandons-zero-rating-investigation-and-moves-backward-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/AKY7-7PTD].
251. Schaub, supra note 20, at 70.
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which already take place, present a more imminent threat to consumers than
many of the long-term effects of a non-neutral net described.252
Zero-rating ultimately pushes consumers towards those services which
offer the best rates, instead of the best content. The streaming services who
benefit from zero-rating, and other forms of prioritization, are given an unfair
advantage, with consumers funneled towards their content services at the expense of alternatives.253 By allowing ISPs to engage in blocking, throttling,
and prioritization, RIFO has turned “service providers into gatekeepers,”254
destroying the open architecture of the internet which, at one time, seemingly
allowed anyone anywhere to create and host content online. Zero-rating and
similar practices, when utilized by ISPs, will ultimately limit the diversity of
content streaming services available, with those who are not partnered with
providers or which lack financial resources, unable to thrive in this ISPcontrolled market.255 The long-term consequences of practices like zero-rating are capable of fundamentally changing the entertainment industry by
awarding viewership on the basis of capital instead of artistic merit. Consumers may be pushed towards those services which offer the best rates instead of the best content.

D. China’s Great Firewall Serves as an Example of Internet
Censorship’s Impact on Innovation
The detrimental effects of blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization
on innovation are poignantly demonstrated by a comparison of these behaviors with China’s censorship policies.256 “For as long as there’s been an Internet, China has sought to monitor and control how its citizens use it.”257
252. See McSherry et al., supra note 217.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Grant Clark, The Great Firewall of China, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018, 6:36
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/great-firewall-of-china [https://perma.cc/G5ZA8CP8] (describing China’s censorship practices, including the country’s “employ[ment] [of] at least
50,000 people to enforce censorship, barring websites it disapproves of and forcing search engines
to filter out content considered harmful.”).
257. Randy James, A Brief History Of: Chinese Internet Censorship, TIME (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1885961,00.html
[https://perma.cc/SH44EW9H].
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China’s efforts are focused predominantly on minimizing public access to
controversial government information through the monitoring of content
hosted online.258 This content is passed through the country’s censorship
framework, known as China’s “Great Firewall,” which blocks or restricts
access to “web sites on an array of sensitive topics . . . .”259 With companies
held accountable for content they host online, even that which is user-generated, there are few options to circumvent this pervasive form of censorship.260
With a population north of 1.4 billion people,261 China houses over 800
million Internet users.262 Given the difficulty (or impossibility) of accessing
certain webpages, these users gravitate towards government-favored websites, such as the Chinese-equivalents of Facebook and Google.263 “For those
who stick to domestic and approved Chinese sites, the browsing experience
is speedy and seamless.”264 For those who do not, their browsing experience
may feature prohibitively long loading times or websites that fail to load at
all.265 Given the effects of China’s censorship framework, companies targeting the massive Chinese user-base have little to no incentive to create
content that risks being censored.266 Facebook, for example, which has historically been censored by China, is seeking to develop censorship tools that

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Clark, supra note 256.
261. Live Update of China’s Population, WORLDOMETERS (May 27, 2019), https://
www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/ [https://perma.cc/RRW6-PZNV].
262. Niall McCarthy, China Now Boasts More than 800 Million Internet Users and 98%
of Them Are Mobile, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/08/23/china-now-boasts-more-than-800-million-internet-users-and-98-of-them-are-mobile-infographic/#3ac5fb567092 [https://perma.cc/W5CA-LD4J].
263. See Nick Frisch, What If You Couldn’t See This Page?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/opinion/net-neutrality-china-internet.html [https://perma.cc
/4F9L-2P7H].
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id.
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will allow its platform entry into the Chinese market.267 Companies like Facebook are not obligated to provide consumers with an uncensored user experience and have little incentive to ignore markets like China in hopes that
their censorship policies will improve.268 Access to the massive Chinese
user-base is financially lucrative and companies who stand to profit may not
shy away from self-censorship if it facilitates their entry.269
China’s censorship policy has a detrimental effect on its film industry,
where “government censorship has blocked potential hits and compelled
filmmakers to stick with safe formulas that aren’t winning audiences.”270 In
2019, China’s box-office totals were reported as declining for the first time
in at least ten years.271 China’s censorship policy not only limits what type
of content may be produced, but also what inspiration creators are able to
access online.272 One article reports that “[w]ith the firewall blocking sites
for obscure reasons, entrepreneurs on the mainland may struggle to innovate,
as blocks on the web make them oblivious to many of the world’s latest
trends and practices.”273
Looking back at Net Neutrality’s repeal in the United States, distinctions can be made between the implications of RIFO and the effects of
China’s “Great Firewall.”274 One distinction concerns where control over

267. Id.
268. E.g., id. (“As private businesses, they are not bound by the First Amendment. Selfcensorship is simply good business.”).
269. See id.
270. Sheryl Tian Tong Lee & Jinshan Hong, China is Stifling its Own Movie Business,
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-10
/china-s-movie-business-is-taking-a-hit-from-its-own-government [https://perma.cc/PV8B-589J].
271. Id.
272. Beibei Bao, How Internet Censorship is Curbing Innovation in China, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-Internet-censorship-iscurbing-innovation-in-china/275188/ [https://perma.cc/R42F-VQH6].
273. China’s Internet Censorship Should be Lifted for the Sake of the Economy and Innovators, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 15, 2018, 9:32 AM), https://www.scmp.com/comment
/letters/article/2141626/chinas-internet-censorship-should-be-lifted-sake-economy-and [https://
perma.cc/68B3-BRER].
274. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 263 (comparing the future of Internet in the United States
to censored Internet in China).
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the Internet resides.275 In China, the government controls the provision of
Internet services, while in the United States, this control rests with ISPs.276
Whether one is more dangerous for consumers is subject to debate, however,
the opportunity for corruption in both is undeniable. As described in Part II,
consumers throughout the United States possess limited options when choosing an ISP, with only 30% of consumers given a choice between three or
more providers.277 Thus, the Chinese government’s centralized control over
the Internet is not so different from the concentrated control of major ISPs
over the provision of Internet services in the United States.278
The motivation underlying the creation of a tailored user experience in
China is blatantly political. However, there is nothing suggesting that the
underlying political motivations of those granted preferential treatment by
ISPs in America will not, in the long-term, result in a comparable bias in the
availability of online resources. The consequences of zero-rating appear to
illustrate yet another similarity between China’s censorship practices and the
non-neutral net in the United States. Using censorship to block access to
websites such as Facebook or Google, China has driven consumers to access
Chinese-owned equivalent services.279 Similarly, in the United States, practices like zero-rating motivate consumers through the offering of lower subscription fees or increased accessibility, to access certain preferred services
at the expense of alternatives.280 Much like censorship has stifled Chinese
innovation, ISPs, by blocking, throttling, and prioritizing content, have the

275. Id.
276. Id. (explaining that “[c]ontent providers — companies like Facebook and LinkedIn —
are not, after all, common carriers . . . [and] do not control the pipes, or carry a unique public trust
in the eyes of the government,” unlike “American telecom companies — those that do control the
pipes.”).
277. Segan, supra note 177 (outlining at study conducted by PC Mag which “looked at test
data from more than 20,000 ZIP codes across the country.”).
278. See id.; see also Lee & Hong, supra note 270.
279. Frisch, supra note 263; see also Paige Leskin, Here are all the Major US tech Companies Blocked Behind China’s ‘Great Firewall’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:23 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/major-us-tech-companies-blocked-from-operating-in-china2019-5 [https://perma.cc/Z8S2-GFAP].
280. See McSherry et al., supra note 217.
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power to skew users towards accessing services that are ISP-owned or financially capable of paying for prioritization.281 ISPs are private corporations
which have an incentive to profit.282 As a result, consumer access to content
online may be tailored to meet the expectations of relationships into which
ISPs have entered, much like consumer access in China is tailored to the
Chinese Government’s political regime. China’s censorship policy illustrates the detrimental impact that restrictions on consumer access to content
online can have on innovation and consumers alike.283

IV. SOLVING THE NON-NEUTRAL NIGHTMARE
With the FCC having turned its back on Net Neutrality, it is up to state
and local governments, as well as online businesses, to preserve the Internet’s open architecture. As set-forth above, the effects of RIFO on the video
streaming service industry could be detrimental, harming innovation, competition, and consumers alike by creating financial barriers to entry. Thus,
the time for intervention is now.
First, this Section will summarize the unsuccessful efforts of states and
private organizations to reverse RIFO in Mozilla Corporation v. Federal
Communications Commission284 (“Mozilla”), a case that was decided by the
D.C. Circuit Court in October, 2019. Second, California’s ability to enact
its own, state-specific Net Neutrality legislation will be addressed in light of
the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision to vacate the FCC’s preemption powers
under RIFO. An analysis of the federal mechanisms which remain as threats
to California’s legislative authority over the regulation of Internet services
will accompany this discussion. Furthermore, the Federal Government’s
case against California, to preempt its state-specific Net Neutrality law, will
be described as an important opportunity for clarification of the Mozilla decision. Third, municipal provision of broadband Internet services will be
described as a promising alternative to the legislative route. Finally, the implementation of city-wide broadband monitoring will be presented as a
method of holding ISPs accountable, regardless of the current state of RIFO
or legislation in this area.

281. See id.
282. See Segan, supra note 177.
283. Bao, supra note 272; Lee & Hong, supra note 270.
284. 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

286

4/10/20 12:27 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

A. Mozilla v. FCC: How States and Private Organizations
Attempted to Overturn RIFO
On October 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit Court decided the Mozilla case,285
issuing an opinion that seemingly nailed another stud into Net Neutrality’s
coffin. This decision put an end to the lawsuit that states and private organizations had initiated against the FCC in response to RIFO over a year and a
half prior.286 Petitioners, led by Mozilla Corporation, argued that the FCC’s
decision was “arbitrary and capricious”287 and “that the FCC’s order unlawfully purport[ed] to preempt state and local regulation of broadband service.”288 The D.C. Circuit Court majority found in favor of the FCC, upholding RIFO and deeming the FCC’s reclassification of the Internet under
Title I valid.289 Despite RIFO’s validity, the majority vacated the portion of
the Order that outlined the FCC’s broad authority to preempt state regulation
of Internet services.290 The majority’s decision invited debate by the concurring and dissenting opinions. Judge Millett, concurring in the judgment,
pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, relied on by the
majority, has become outdated as a result of the technological advancements
that have been made in the Internet services industry.291 The lone dissenter,
Judge Williams, envisioned an entirely different outcome with respect to the
majority’s decision to vacate RIFO’s preemption directive based on, what he

285. Id. at 1.
286. See E-mail from Markham C. Erickson, Couns., Mozilla Corporation, to Thomas M.
Johnson, Gen. Couns., Federal Communications Commission (Feb. 22, 2018), https://
blog.mozilla.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Mozilla-Petition-for-Review-WC-Docket-No.-17108-Letter-to-FCC-22Feb2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGA7-M6F2]; see Protective Petition For
Review, New York, et al. v. FCC, No. 18-1013 (D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2018).
287. Proof Brief for Government Petitioners at 15, Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, No. 18-1051(L)
(D.C. Aug, 20, 2018).
288. New York v. FCC, No. 18-1013 (D.C. filed Jan. 16th, 2018) (listing the states included
in the lawsuit as being California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and the District of Columbia).
289. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18, 35.
290. Id. at 18, 74.
291. Id. at 87 (Millet, J., concurring).
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believes, is the proper interpretation of existing precedent derived from the
United States Supreme Court.292
In addressing RIFO’s validity, the D.C. Circuit, “approach[ed] the issue through the lens of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X.293 In Brand
X, the Supreme Court applied the analytical framework it had established in
Chevron as applicable to issues involving the authority of federal agencies.294
Because Brand X relied heavily on the framework delineated in Chevron, it
is appropriate to offer a description of the Chevron decision here. Chevron
involved a dispute between the states and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) over the meaning of the term, “stationary source,” as used in
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (the “Amendments”).295 The Supreme Court ultimately found the EPA’s interpretation of stationary sources
as encompassing whole industrial plants reasonable, applying a two-prong
analysis that has become known as the Chevron framework.296 The first
Chevron factor asks “whether Congress has directly spoken on the question
at issue.”297 If the intent of Congress is clear, the court has adequate guidance to interpret the statute and does not owe deference to the agency’s interpretation.298 If Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, but has instead been ambiguous or silent, leaving “a gap for the agency to fill,” the
agency possesses regulatory authority.299 Where the agency possesses regulatory authority, the reviewing court must exercise deference in answering
the second question in Chevron: Whether the agency’s interpretation of the
statute is reasonable.300 The deferential standard of the Chevron framework
favors decisions made by federal agencies, giving them “controlling weight
292. Id. at 96–97 (Williams, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
294. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 969
(2005); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
295. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 842.
298. Id. at 842–43.
299. Id. at 843–44.
300. Id.
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unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”301
Where an agency’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law,” the Administrative Procedure Act
requires that it be set aside by the court.302
In Brand X, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether
the FCC had properly classified broadband cable modem services as information services under Title I of the 1996 Act.303 This issue of classification
revolved around the FCC’s interpretation of “telecommunications services”
and “information services” as defined in the Act.304 In applying the first
prong of the Chevron analysis, the Supreme Court found that Section 151 of
the 1996 Act, which employs the FCC to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary . . . to carry out the [1996 Act’s] provisions,” evidenced Congress’s intent that the interpretation of this Act fall under the
FCC’s jurisdiction.305 Moving on to the second Chevron factor, the Supreme
Court found that the FCC’s interpretation of “information services,” as including cable modem services was permissible under the 1996 Act.306 The
Commission reasoned that, “because [cable modem service] provides consumers with a comprehensive capability for manipulating information using
the Internet,” it fell within the 1996 Act’s definition of information services.307 In making this argument, the FCC pointed specifically to Domain
Name Services (DNS) and caching, two functionalities it deemed inseparable to the Internet’s transmission and use, which require the manipulation
component necessary to satisfy this definition.308 In other words, the FCC
argued that because a couple of processes tied to the provision of Internet
services could be classified as information services, Internet services as a
whole should be too.

301. Id.
302. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2020).
303. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 980.
306. Id. at 971.
307. Id. at 987.
308. Id. at 999.
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Ten years after the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Brand X, the FCC
issued the 2015 Open Internet Order, reclassifying Internet services as telecommunications services under Title II of the Communications Act.309 The
FCC then reclassified Internet services again seven years later with RIFO,
this time as information services back under Title I.310 Thus, when Mozilla
was brought in front of the D.C. Circuit Court, the Internet’s classification
had come full circle. The court was asked to answer the same question it had
answered in Brand X: whether the FCC’s classification of Internet services
under Title I of the Communications Act was valid.311 Addressing the first
Chevron factor, the D.C. Circuit Court followed the binding precedent setforth by Brand X, finding that the 1996 Act had left issues of classification
to the Commission’s discretion.312 Turning to the second Chevron Factor,
the D.C. Circuit Court was equally bound by Brand X.313 Once again, DNS
and caching were found to be indispensable to the online user experience and
so “inextricably intertwined” with Internet services as to render the Internet’s
classification as an information service reasonable.314
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X bound the Circuit
Court’s opinion in Mozilla,315 the relevance of Brand X’s application fifteen
years after it was decided is questionable. In her concurrence, Judge Millett
describes how the technological landscape has shifted since Brand X.316 She
argues that the major role that “auxiliary services like DNS and caching”
once played in Internet access has decreased substantially over the last fifteen years.317 DNS, which at the time of Brand X was available only as part
309. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601 (2015)
(reclassifying the Internet as a telecommunications service under Title II).
310. See generally Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311 (2018) (reclassifying
the Internet as an information service under Title I).
311. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 18–19 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
312. Id. at 19–20.
313. Id. at 20.
314. Id. at 21.
315. Id. at 89 (Millett, J., concurring).
316. Id. at 90–91.
317. Id.
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of the Internet services provisioned by ISPs, is now available through a variety of online providers.318 Similarly, the prevalence of caching, which does
not work when a website is encrypted, has dramatically decreased as encrypted user traffic reached 50% in 2017.319 By relying on these functionalities to support its classification of the Internet as an information service,
Judge Millett concludes that “the Commission misses the technological forest for a twig.”320 This point is of particular importance, with Judge Millet
emphasizing that Brand X has become “unhinged from the realities of modern broadband service” and as a result, modern Internet regulation risks becoming “trapped . . . . in technological anachronism.”321
It is clear that the Internet today is dramatically different that the Internet as it is existed “during the bygone era of iPods, AOL, and Razr flip
phones,” when Brand X was decided.322 If the Mozilla decision is appealed
to the Supreme Court, Brand X may finally be retired and replaced with precedent that is more relevant to the current technological landscape and favorable to Net Neutrality. 323 Alternatively, Congress could enact legislation
that speaks directly to the Internet’s classification and thus, replace Brand X
as the guiding precedent in this area.324 This option, however, seems much
less likely to favor Net Neutrality. The Net Neutrality debate has become a
political issue, with conservatives largely in favor of repealing these regulations.325 Under the current administration, in which both the executive
branch and Senate are Republican-controlled,326 federal legislation in this
area is likely to mirror RIFO, removing Net Neutrality protections.
318. Id. at 90.
319. Id. at 91.
320. Id. at 94.
321. Id. at 89.
322. Id. at 87.
323. Id. at 89.
324. Id.
325. Kate Patrick, How Political Messaging Drives the Net Neutrality Debate, INSIDE
SOURCES (April 10, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/how-political-messaging-drives-thenet-neutrality-debate/ [https://perma.cc/UC4S-54ZN].
326. Id.
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As of the Mozilla decision, RIFO is in full effect and ISPs continue to
enjoy the freedom to block, throttle, and prioritize content online that they
did as of the Order’s passing in 2018.327 However, the fight for Net Neutrality may not be over. By vacating the portion of RIFO which outlined the
FCC’s broad preemption authority under this Order, it appears that the D.C.
Circuit has opened the door to state regulation of Internet services.328 However, until the Mozilla decision is applied to a case involving a state law
which conflicts with RIFO, the intricacies of the D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion when applied to a real-world scenario are unknown. While the Mozilla
decision is clear as to the FCC’s lacking authority to preempt state regulations which conflict with RIFO,329 this does not mean that state regulation in
this area is immune to other federal obstacles such as conflict preemption or
the dormant Commerce Clause. As described by Williams in Mozilla, “[t]he
consequences of the Commission’s choice of Title I depend on its having
authority to preempt.”330 How RIFO will be enforced, in light of the FCC’s
lacking authority to preempt, is unclear.

B. California Aims to Restore Net Neutrality with Senate Bill 822
On September 30, 2018, eight months after Net Neutrality’s repeal,
California Governor Jerry Brown approved Senate Bill 822, which would
replace many of the safeguards abandoned by the FCC.331 This new state
law would, “[prohibit] . . . ISPs, from blocking or slowing access to legal
online content, demanding special fees from websites to prioritize their traffic or charging customers for special exemptions to caps on their data.”332
While the Bill promised a restoration of Net Neutrality to Californians, it

327. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18 (majority opinion).
328. Id. at 86.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 97 (Williams, J., dissenting).
331. California Internet Consumer Protection and Neutrality Act of 2018, S. 822, 2018
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
332. Alex Johnson, California Enacts Net Neutrality Bill, DOJ Counters With Lawsuit,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018, 1:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/Internet/gov-jerry-brownsigns-bill-restore-net-neutrality-california-n915221 [https://perma.cc/LF7G-2E43].

YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

292

4/10/20 12:27 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

never got the opportunity to do so.333 The same day Governor Jerry Brown
signed Senate Bill 822, the Federal Government announced its plan to sue
California for attempting to interfere with federal legislation.334 The government’s case against California, United States v. California, was then filed in
the Eastern District of California.335 In support of Senate Bill 822’s preemption, the DOJ argued that the Bill “unlawfully imposes burdens on the Federal Government’s deregulatory approach to the Internet,” making enforcement of RIFO by the FCC nearly impossible.336 Ultimately, California and
the DOJ agreed to stay United States v. California until the D.C. Circuit
Court rendered its decision in Mozilla.337 Now that the D.C. Circuit has done
so, this case is more important than ever. While the D.C. Circuit Court’s
opinion vacates the FCC’s Preemption Directive under RIFO,338 it is unclear
whether other bars may exist to state regulation of Internet services. United
States v. California could be the first decision to illustrate the application of
Mozilla to a conflicting state law. Furthermore, if the court in United States
v. California ultimately upholds California’s Bill, this could represent a massive step towards achieving Net Neutrality nationwide.339

333. Id.
334. Klint Finley, California Will Pause Net Neutrality Law for Federal Suit, WIRED (Oct.
26, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-will-pause-net-neutrality-law-forfederal-suit/ [https://perma.cc/UX7G-RKU5].
335. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2018).
336. Justice Department Files Net Neutrality Lawsuit Against the State of California, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-netneutrality-lawsuit-against-state-california-0 [https://perma.cc/9K9A-W2V4].
337. Stipulation Regarding Temporary Stay Of Litigation And Agreement Not To Enforce
Senate Bill 822, United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018).
338. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 86 (majority opinion).
339. QuickFacts California, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA [https://perma.cc/XVM6-LETL] (listing California’s population,
as of July 1, 2019, as 39,512,223); Hans Johnson, California’s Population, PUBLIC POLICY
INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA (Mar. 2017), https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-population/
[https://perma.cc/L27Q-R6NJ] (describing California as “the most populous state in the nation.”);
Makena Kelly, California’s Net Neutrality Bill Could Set a National Standard, THE VERGE (June
4, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/4/17414384/california-net-neutrality-bill-washingtonepa [https://perma.cc/YEY2-LTRU] (describing California’s history of “single-handedly forcing
national legislation . . . .”).
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1. The D.C. Circuit Court Rejects the FCC’s Preemption Directive
Denying the FCC’s power to preempt under RIFO, the Mozilla majority found that the Commission had made a “fatal” mistake when it “ignored
binding precedent by failing to ground its sweeping Preemption Directive . . . in a lawful source of statutory authority.”340 Judge Williams disagreed with this finding in the dissenting portion of his opinion.341 Here,
Williams argued that the FCC, while lacking express authority to preempt,
possessed implied authority stemming from the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Brand X, Chevron, and other applicable case precedent.342
The D.C. Circuit Court previously set-out the limited circumstances in
which the FCC possesses authority to preempt state law in Public Service
Commission of Maryland v. Federal Communications Commission (“Maryland”).343 In this case, the court held that, “FCC preemption of state regulation is . . . permissible when (1) the matter to be regulated has both interstate
and intrastate aspects . . . ; (2) FCC preemption is necessary to protect a valid
federal regulatory objective . . . ; and (3) state regulation would ‘negate[] the
exercise by the FCC of its own lawful authority.’”344 The final factor is met
where the interstate and intrastate aspects of the service are so intertwined
that state regulation would interfere with the FCC’s authority to do the
same.345 The court’s decision in Maryland clarified that “the FCC cannot
regulate (let alone preempt state regulation of) any service that does not fall
within its Title II jurisdiction over common carrier services or its Title I jurisdiction over matters ‘incidental’ to communication by wire.”346 This same
principle was instructed by the Supreme Court two years prior in City of New
York v. FCC, where the court lamented that, “an agency literally has no

340. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 74.
341. Id. at 102–04 (Williams, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 104.
343. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. v. F.C.C., 909 F.2d 1510, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
344. Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 429
(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1514 n.4.
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power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign
State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”347
When a service is classified under Title II of the 1934 Act, the FCC
possesses “express and expansive authority” to regulate it.348 Thus, by default, the majority found that when the FCC reclassified Internet services
under Title I, the Commission lost its express authority to preempt state action under Title II.349 However, as identified by the court in Maryland, the
FCC may still possess the power to preempt where the subject in question is,
“incidental to [the] transmission [of communication by wire].”350 This authority, known as ancillary jurisdiction, is available to the FCC when: “(1)
the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I of the Communications Act covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.’”351 As dictated by the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Comcast, the “mandated responsibilities” referenced must be setforth in “Title II, III or VI of the Act.”352 Given that RIFO reclassified the
Internet under Title I, the standard for ancillary jurisdiction was not met, and
the majority found that the FCC failed to establish authority to preempt on
this basis as well.353
As was upheld by the Supreme Court in Brand X, the FCC possesses
the requisite authority under the Communications Act to interpret its various
titles and classify services within them.354 This is evidenced by the FCC’s
classification of Internet services under Title II of the 1996 Act in its 2015

347. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 80 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
348. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
349. Id. at 75–76.
350. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 909 F.2d at 1514 (citations omitted).
351. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 76 (citations omitted).
352. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
353. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 75–76.
354. Id. at 84.
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Open Internet Order and the Commission’s reclassification of Internet services under Title I of this act with RIFO.355 Which title the FCC ultimately
chooses to classify a service under will determine the Commissions ability
to regulate it, with Title II services subject to substantially greater federal
regulation than Title I services.356 Ultimately, the Mozilla court found that
by classifying Internet services under Title I of the 1996 Act but subsequently seeking to regulate the Internet as a Title II service, “the Commission
overlook[ed] the Communications Act’s vision of dual federal-state authority and cooperation in this area specifically.”357 If the FCC wanted to increase its regulatory authority over Internet services it could, as it has done
before, by reclassifying these services under Title II.358 However, the current
political climate makes this alternative seem highly unlikely. The head of
the FCC, Ajit Pai, who was appointed by President Donald Trump, has actively fought against the Internet’s classification under Title II.359
Instead, the FCC must ground its authority to preempt in the Internet’s
classification as it stands today, under Title I. Citing to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brand X, Williams argued in his dissenting opinion that the
FCC’s authority to interpret and classify services under Title I implied that
the Commission was authorized to preempt state regulation of Title I services.360 Williams also pointed to the inseparability of the interstate and intrastate components of Internet services as requiring that the FCC possess
power to preempt under the impossibility exception.361 This exception, “allows the FCC to preempt state regulation of a service if (1) it is not possible
to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects of the service, and (2) federal
regulation is necessary to further a valid federal regulatory objective.”362

355. See Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5601 (2015); see
also Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 311, 311 (2018).
356. See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2019); see also § 151.
357. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 81.
358. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5601.
359. Knight, supra note 174.
360. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 98–99 (Williams, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 96.
362. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm’n. v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 578 (8th Cir. 2007).

YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

296

4/10/20 12:27 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

The majority disagreed with William’s finding that the FCC possessed
implied authority to preempt. First, the majority noted that this argument
fails by default, as it was not advanced by the FCC as a justification for the
Commission’s authority to preempt and instead, was William’s own “invent[ion].”363 Next, the majority explained that, even if this argument were
at issue, Williams failed to show how the FCC’s implied authority to preempt
would act as a substitute for the Commission’s lacking jurisdiction under the
Communications Act.364 “[T]he Commission’s power to choose one regulatory destination or another does not carry with it the option to mix and match
its favorite parts of both.”365 This means that the FCC, by choosing to classify Internet services under Title I, cannot now use its regulatory authority
under Title II as a basis for preemption.
With Mozilla vacating a portion of the FCC’s Order, proponents may
consider this as a silver lining, welcoming states to pass their own legislation
concerning net neutrality. At the same time, the Mozilla decision muddies
the waters. Specifically, Mozilla does not appear to definitively answer
whether conflicting state laws will avoid federal preemption altogether, or
only preemption by the FCC under the Preemption Directive. Furthermore,
conflict preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause, as discussed below,
remain as federal roadblocks to state-specific legislation. This makes the
federal government’s case against California that much more important.
United States v. California could serve as the first application of the Mozilla
decision, showcasing how state laws will navigate the legislative arena now
that RIFO’s preemption directive has been vacated.

2. Federal Preemption May Still Present a Barrier to State Success
While the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the FCC’s broad authority to
preempt state regulation of the Internet under RIFO, the Court’s opinion appears to leave the door open to other forms of federal preemption as possible
alternatives to estop state laws.366 The Federal Government’s power to
preempt state law which interfere with its own is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution which, in Article IV, states:

363. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 82 (majority opinion).
364. Id. at 82–83.
365. Id. at 84.
366. Id. at 85.
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This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding.367
Out of the Supremacy Clause came various forms of federal preemption, including conflict preemption.368 Conflict preemption works to protect
federal laws by estopping, “state laws that under the circumstances of the
particular case stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objective of Congress.”369 Conflict preemption does
not serve as an outright ban on all state legislation in a particular area, only
that which is in direct interference with federal law.370
The FCC, in arguing that the Preemption Directive should be upheld,
reasoned that application of conflict preemption to state laws interfering with
RIFO would render the same, broad preemptory effect as the Directive.371
The D.C. Circuit Court did not outright disagree with the Commission that
the principle of conflict preemption, if applied to a conflicting state law,
could render that law moot.372 However, the Court refused to uphold the
broad Preemption Directive on this reasoning alone, finding that conflict
preemption requires the court to perform a unique, fact-intensive analysis of
the specific conflicting state or local law called into question and thus, cannot
be used as a basis to block any and all legislation in a specific area.373 Conflict preemption requires the court to answer, “‘an issue incapable of resolution in the abstract,’ let alone in gross.”374 Thus, the D.C. Circuit Court’s

367. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
368. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
369. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 81.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 81–82.
374. Id. at 81.
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ruling infers that if a conflicting state law were to be presented, it would not
be subject to automatic preemption under the Directive, however it could
still be preempted if, after analysis, a court found the law to impermissibly
interfere with RIFO.375

3. The Dormant Commerce Clause May Pose an Additional Federal
Obstacle
State laws in conflict with RIFO may face prohibition if challenged
under the dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”).376 This doctrine is an implied extension of the Commerce Clause which gives Congress the power to,
“regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.”377 While the Commerce Clause grants Congress
affirmative regulatory authority, under certain circumstances, “it imposes
limitations on the States.”378 In South Dakota v. Wayfair (“Wayfair”), the
Supreme Court enumerated the behaviors prohibited by the DCC as follows:
“First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce
. . . . [S]econd, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce.”379 Of particular interest to the discussion here is whether California’s Senate Bill 822, if passed, could be found to violate the DCC by being
unduly burdensome on interstate commerce; engaging in the second prohibited behavior identified in Wayfair.380

375. This distinction mirrors that which divides facial and as-applied challenges to Federal
statutes. Field Day, L.L.C. v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A ‘facial
challenge’ to a statute considers only the text of the statute itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual. An ‘as-applied challenge,’ on the other hand, requires an analysis
of the facts of a particular case to determine whether the application of the statute” is unconstitutional as applied to an individual).
376. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Peculiar Case of State Network Neutrality Regulation, 37
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 659, 690 (2019).
377. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
378. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018).
379. Id. at 2091.
380. This section provides a general description of the dormant Commerce Clause and a
cursory overview of how the dormant Commerce Clause may preempt state law. The description
of the dormant Commerce Clause provided in this section does not delve into the intricacies of this
clause or its application.
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In determining whether an Arizona state law was unduly burdensome,
the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church (“Pike”) focused on the relationship between the burden imposed by the law and the local interests it
served.381 There, the law mandating specific packaging for cantaloupes and
other produce transported out of the state was challenged by California as
being unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.382 In analyzing California’s claim, the Supreme Court laid out the following rule to be used in interpreting the burden of a particular state law: “Where the statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”383 The Supreme Court ultimately found that Arizona’s
interest in, “meet[ing] certain standards of wholesomeness and quality,” in
an effort to uphold the states reputation in the produce industry, was insufficient to justify the burden its law imposed on interstate commerce.384 Many
subsequent cases have found that otherwise valid enactments under a state’s
police power were too burdensome on interstate commerce and hence invalid
under the DCC.385
Turning now to California’s Senate Bill 822, a description of the burden this law has the potential to impose on interstate commerce will first be
presented and then weighed against California’s putative interest in enacting
it.

a. Senate Bill 822’s Potential Burden on Interstate Commerce
Traditionally, Internet services have been treated as interstate services.386 This is evident from the exclusive regulation of the Internet by the
Federal Government since it came into existence.387 The D.C. Circuit court’s
381. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
382. Id. at 138.
383. Id. at 142.
384. Id. at 142–43.
385. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976); Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 678 (1981).
386. Nachbar, supra note 376, at 689.
387. Id.
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new ruling may have changed that, appearing to open the door to state regulation in this area, at least marginally.388 However, how states will be able
to regulate Internet services given the fundamentally interstate nature of the
Internet is unclear.389 While California’s law applies only to those providers
who serve Californians, the Bill fails to appreciate that the ISPs transmitting
these services may do so from across state lines.390 This ambiguity is described by Williams in his dissenting opinion in Mozilla.391 Williams points
out that the inseparability of interstate and intrastate transmissions of Internet
services make it unlikely that ISPs will distinguish between them, causing
these providers to apply the most stringent state regulation nation-wide and
abandoning RIFO.392 Williams’ factual view seems valid. Thus, California’s Bill in practice could effectively regulate out-of-state conduct, conduct
which the state does not possess, “a legitimate interest in regulating.”393 Furthermore, the behavior which California’s law seeks to prevent, namely
blocking and prioritization, can take place at various points along the journey
from ISP to consumer, meaning that enforcement of the law within the state
alone is not likely to render the desired result.394 If passed, California’s Bill
will impose some degree of burden on interstate commerce; however,
whether this burden is unconstitutional requires further analysis.

b. Putative Local Benefits of Senate Bill 822
For California’s law to be upheld under the standard set forth in Pike,
its putative local benefit must outweigh the burden it causes interstate commerce.395 In addressing the putative local benefit of a specific law, courts

388. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
389. Nachbar, supra note 376, at 690.
390. California Internet Consumer Protection and Neutrality Act of 2018, S. 822, 2018
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); see also Nachbar, supra note 376, at 692 (explaining that Senate Bill
822 will likely apply to out-of-state ISPs).
391. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 97 (Williams, J., dissenting).
392. Id.
393. Nachbar, supra note 376, at 690.
394. Id. at 691–92.
395. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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look to the benefit that the legislation purports to advance.396 Whether this
benefit is ultimately realized is not of consequence to this analysis.397 Instead, it only matters that the legislature, in passing the law, acted on the
assumption that it would confer such benefits.398 If a putative benefit exists,
this purported benefit must outweigh the law’s burden on interstate commerce.399 If it does, then the court will uphold the law and any future preclusion will be dependent on Congress who may still enact legislation which
directly preempts the state law in question.400
Section I of Senate Bill 822 sets forth the purpose underlying this law,
providing that it will “protect and promote the safety, life, public health, public convenience, general prosperity, and well-being of society, and the welfare of the state’s population and economy, that are increasingly dependent
on an open and neutral Internet.”401 California’s legislature goes on to state
that “[a]lmost every sector of California’s economy, democracy, and society
is dependent on the open and neutral Internet.”402 The sectors enumerated
as those protected by Senate Bill 822 include: “police and emergency services”; “[h]ealth and safety services and infrastructure”; “[e]ducation”; and
“[b]usiness and economic activity.”403 Police and fire personnel, for example, depend on the Internet to transmit real time alerts, informing them of
emergencies. Senate Bill 822 ensures that these alerts will not be slowed or
otherwise blocked by the ISP servicing these professionals.
If California’s law is challenged under the DCC, the State should focus
on advancing how the Bill’s benefit to public safety—by protecting police,
first responders, and more—outweighs its consequential burden on interstate
commerce. In Mozilla, the D.C. Circuit Court remanded the portion of RIFO
396. Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence, 98 F. Supp. 3d 408, 417 (D.R.I. 2015).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987).
401. California Internet Consumer Protection and Neutrality Act of 2018, S. 822, 2018
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
402. Id.
403. Id.

YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

302

4/10/20 12:27 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

in which the FCC addresses public safety concerns, finding that the FCC had
failed to adequately address this issue.404 Based on the importance the D.C.
Circuit has placed on these concerns, California’s law is more likely to survive a DCC challenge if public safety is emphasized.405 This determination
is, however, ultimately at the discretion of the court. While it seems California may succeed in arguing that its Bill confers a substantial putative benefit to its residents, Senate Bill 822’s potential to regulate out-of-state commerce is not likely to be overlooked.406 If Senate Bill 822 is ultimately found
to violate the DCC, this does not mean that California is out of options. By
acting as a market participant under an exception to the DCC, California may
be able to offer its own broadband services to those living in the state without
facing federal preemption or prohibition.

C. Cities Takeover as ISPs, Distributing Internet Service as a Utility
If you cannot beat them, join them. As illustrated by this old adage,
state and local governments, if unsuccessful in their efforts to replace Net
Neutrality by regulation, may want to consider engaging in the provision of
municipally-owned broadband services.407 Local governments are composed of publicly held officials who are more responsive to the concerns of
their citizens than are privately-held corporations who can take their business
elsewhere.408 This public-control makes government’s less susceptible to the
financial incentives which may motivate privately-owned ISPs to engage in
the blocking, throttling and prioritization of content.409 Thus, by creating
their own infrastructure capable of offering Internet services, state and local

404. Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (majority opinion).
405. See id. at 59–63.
406. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (setting forth the rule to apply
in ascertaining whether a law unduly burdens interstate commerce).
407. David Z. Morris, Could Threats to Net Neutrality Spark Interest in Local Broadband?, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/12/28/net-neutrality-municipal-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/F5CE-8JQP].
408. Id.
409. See generally id.
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governments have the ability to provide their citizens with an alternative service to that offered by ISPs.410 This alternative service has the ability to
create a local market which is not guarded by financial barriers to entry, giving start-ups with limited financial resources the opportunity to offer their
services to consumers online without being edged out by competition from
industry giants with deeper pockets and limitless resources.411 Importantly,
this solution is less likely to face preemption, or prohibition by the Federal
Government than the adoption of state-specific Net Neutrality laws.412

1. State and Local Governments May Participate in the Market as
Competitors
The DCC, which prohibits states from enacting laws that “discriminate
against or impose an undue burden on interstate commerce,”413 does not prevent state and local governments from competing with private businesses by
offering their own equivalent goods and services to consumers.414 By choosing to do so, these entities fall under an exception to the DCC known as the
market participant doctrine.415 The market participant doctrine distinguishes
states as regulators of a market from states as participants in a market.416
State and local governments operating as market participants under this
exception are treated, in many respects, as private businesses by the Supreme
Court.417 This distinction originates with the Supreme Court’s ruling in New

410. Adam Sneed, What Can Cities and States Do About Net Neutrality?, CITYLAB (Dec.
15, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2017/12/what-can-cities-and-states-do-about-netneutrality/548546/ [https://perma.cc/3SAL-2JYK].
411. See generally id.
412. See generally id. (presenting municipally owned broadband as an alternative to other
preempted solutions to Net Neutrality’s repeal).
413. David S. Bogen, The Market Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule,
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543 (2006).
414. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550
U.S. 330, 342 (2007).
415. Bogen, supra note 413, at 552.
416. Id. at 546.
417. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946).
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York v. United States.418 There, the Supreme Court held that New York, by
bottling and selling water, could not enjoy “sovereign” immunity from federal taxes as it would have otherwise had it been providing government-related services.419 New York, deciding to engage in the water-bottling business, was treated the same as any other privately-held business.420
Furthermore, in the Supreme Court’s later decision rendered in United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the
Court found that states may make their provision of services to consumers
conditional, much like any private business can.421 In this case, the Supreme
Court held that flow ordinances put in place by the defendant, a government
entity, did not violate the DCC because the defendant provided its own
county-wide waste management services.422 By restricting its own services
through the imposition of these flow ordinances, the defendant was subject
to the same constitutional limitations it would have been, had it been acting
in its capacity as a state when imposing these same regulations on third parties.423
The market participant doctrine allows state and local governments
who compete with other privately-owned businesses to restrict their own
provision of goods and services without violating the Commerce Clause.424
When these governments act as market participants, they are able to operate
their business much like any other competitor is able to operate theirs.425
States acting under the market participant exception are in no way exempt
from federal law and are still subject to regulation by Congress in the same
way that private businesses are.426 However, the constitutional limitations
which would ordinarily block certain behaviors by the state, in the interest
418. See id. at 582.
419. Id. at 575.
420. Id. at 579.
421. 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007).
422. Id. at 343–44.
423. Id.
424. Bogen, supra note 413, at 543.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 545.
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of preserving the balance of power between the state and federal governments, do not apply.427
Furthermore, precedent supports that courts are less likely to find that
implied preemption precludes state ordinances put in place by states acting
as market participants.428 Federal law may expressly or impliedly preempt
state law.429 Express preemption occurs when the language of the federal
law includes phrases which explicitly indicate the law is intended to preempt
state law regulating the subject matter in question.430 In contrast, implied
preemption “focus[es] on Congress’s intent,” where the federal law in question does not contain explicit language precluding state regulation of the subject matter.431 There are two subcategories of implied preemption, one of
which is conflict preemption (described above as a potential bar to state regulation of Internet services).432 Thus, if California acts as a market participant in providing broadband services, courts could be less likely to find the
state’s regulation of this service precluded by conflict preemption. However,
if Congress were to pass a law which explicitly prohibits states from regulating broadband, California would be expressly preempted from doing so
regardless of whether it does so when acting as a market participant.
The Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal (“Burbank”) illustrate how local governments engaged in the regulation of a privately-owned commodity are differentiated from local governments engaged in the regulation of one that is
municipally-owned in that they are not barred by a finding of implied
preemption.433 In this case, the Court found that Burbank’s imposition of an
ordinance which restricted air travel between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and
7:00 a.m. was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“Aviation

427. Id.
428. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 634 (1973).
429. JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45825, FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 2 (2019).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 17.
432. Id. at 2.
433. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 634; id. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Act”), which outlawed state and local regulation of aircraft noise.434 In its
reasoning, the Court referred to the Senate and House reports on the Aviation
Act which stated, in pertinent part, that this act was intended to preempt state
and local regulation of aircraft noise but not to preempt regulation by private
airport operators.435 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority’s emphasis on this differentiation inferred that, had the local government
owned the airport,436 they would not have been preempted by the Aviation
Act from regulating aircraft noise.437

2. California May Be Well-Suited to Implement This Solution
If state and local governments are able to erect their own infrastructure,
or purchase or condemn438 the infrastructure necessary to transmit Internet
services, they will be able to offer an Internet alternative to their citizens.
This Internet alternative is capable of providing consumers with a user experience untailored by the financial incentives of their ISP while providing
small, online businesses with a market that is not guarded by financial barriers to entry.439 If they choose to do so, judicial precedent supports that state
and local governments will be able to structure their provision of these services without facing federal preemption.440 As supported by the Court’s reasoning in Lockheed, state and local governments regulating the provision of

434. Id. at 625–33 (majority opinion).
435. Id. at 634.
436. Hollywood-Burbank Airport Authority President William B. Rudell Signing Documents 1977, BURBANK IN FOCUS (Jan. 7, 2017), https://burbankinfocus.org/islandora/object/islandora%3A1263 [https://perma.cc/4E4X-J3AX] (providing that in 1997, four years after the decision in Burbank was rendered, the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena purchased Lockheed
Air Terminal together and began operating it as a public air terminal).
437. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
438. Local government’s condemnation power would likely be adequate for this purpose.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding that the city’s condemnation of land
owned by unwilling sellers did not violate the Takings Clause because it was taken to benefit the
public). State and local governments seeking to avoid the high installation costs of Internet services
infrastructure may consider making a similar argument in favor of condemnation.
439. See generally Sneed, supra note 410.
440. See City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 634 (majority opinion).
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municipally-owned Internet services in their area are likely to be more successful than they would be attempting to regulate ISPs.441 Contract restrictions, which have the same practical effect as regulation, could not only
serve to protect consumer access, but to place competitive pressure on the
privately-owned ISPs serving their area to offer comparable services.442 In
response to the growing interest in municipally-owned broadband across the
states, ISPs have spent over $92 million dollars lobbying for regulations prohibiting it.443 While twenty-five states have outlawed its practice, California
has not.444 In fact, California has already begun providing broadband services in certain contexts.445 Through the state’s creation of the K–12 High
Speed Network, California provides broadband services to public schools
and it plans to do the same for public libraries.446 Furthermore, the California
Broadband Council, which was established by the California legislature in
2010, and the California Broadband Cooperative are working to promote the
provision of broadband services in, “unserved and underserved areas of the
state.”447 Thus, it seems that California has begun taking steps towards the
state-wide provision of broadband services. As a state which has pioneered
so many regulations which have expanded nationwide, California may be the
best-suited candidate to implement this solution448 which at this time seems
to be the most promising alternative to the reinstatement of Net Neutrality.
441. Id.
442. Sneed, supra note 410.
443. Kendra Chamberlain, Municipal Broadband is Roadblocked or Outlawed in 25 States,
BROADBANDNOW (April 17, 2019), https://broadbandnow.com/report/municipal-broadband-roadblocks/ [https://perma.cc/YM6F-6QNF].
444. Id.
445. California K-12 High Speed Network, CAL. DEPT. OF EDUC. (May 23, 2018), https://
www.cde.ca.gov/ls/et/hs/ [https://perma.cc/6NM8-CGSD].
446. Id.; High-Speed Broadband in California Libraries, CAL. ST. LIBR., https://library.ca.gov/services/to-libraries/broadband [https://perma.cc/K24J-5NWM].
447. Welcome to the California Broadband Council, CAL. BROADBAND COUNCIL (Oct.17,
2019), https://broadbandcouncil.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/QL4L-WHJS]; Mission Statement, CAL.
BROADBAND COOPERATIVE https://www.cbccoop.com [https://perma.cc/PLL8-JMQX].
448. Makena Kelly, California’s Net Neutrality Bill Could Set a National Standard, THE
VERGE (June 4, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/4/17414384/california-net-neutralitybill-washington-epa [https://perma.cc/L4BR-K7WE].
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D. City-Wide Monitoring of Broadband Speeds to Increase ISP
Accountability
In the absence of Net Neutrality, monitoring where and when bandwidth throttling occurs can help keep ISPs accountable.449 At this time, it is
unclear what efforts the FCC will take to ensure ISP compliance with disclosure laws.450 Thus, it will be up to consumers, private organizations, and
state and local governments to monitor broadband speed and notify the FCC
when Providers have failed to issue proper disclosures.451
Cities control the service agreements they enter into with ISPs to service those living in their area.452 Thus, cities that collect “quality information
on Internet speeds across neighborhoods” can use this information to put
pressure on their Internet service providers.453 If ISPs engage in unwanted
blocking or data throttling behaviors, cities can decide to terminate the provider and receive services from a competitor.454 Cities have taken action
against ISPs providing unsatisfactory services before.455 In New York v.
Charter Communications (“Charter Communications”), the City of New
York sued Spectrum, an Internet provider, for misrepresenting its Internet
speeds after an investigation prompted by thousands of consumer complaints

449. Chris Bousquet, How Data Visualization Can Help Cities Save Net Neutrality, DATASMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/howdata-visualization-can-help-cities-save-net-neutrality-1183 [https://perma.cc/QP73-S7CW].
450. See FED. COMM. COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON OPEN INTERNET TRANSPARENCY RULE
REQUIREMENTS (2016).
451. See id.
452. Eric Null, How Local Legislatures are Fighting for Better Broadband Privacy, PAC.
STANDARD (Nov. 15, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-justice/localities-fight-for-better-broadband-security [https://perma.cc/N2JN-VH6T].
453. Bousquet, supra note 449.
454. Id.
455. See generally New York v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 450318/2017, 2018 WL
919991 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 2018).
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revealed that the provider “falsely advertise[d] Internet speeds beyond its
capability.”456 Ultimately, New York won.457
State consumer protection laws, like those which prohibit fraud, are not
generally preempted by federal economic regulation.458 For example, in
Charter Communications, the court found that the FCC’s Transparency
Rule, which requires providers to report honest information regarding the
cost and speed of their Internet services,459 did not preempt New York State
consumer protection laws.460 Here, the court found that Spectrum’s compliance with the Federal Transparency Rule did not make it exempt from compliance with state laws governing “‘fraud, deception, and false advertising
. . . .’”461 However, previous attempts by California to create regulations
which require disclosure have been subject to preemption.462 Thus, if California attempts to create regulations that require citizens to disclose their
broadband speed, the state may again be precluded. California is more likely
to be successful if it instead creates a voluntary reporting system from which
the state is able to collect and analyze information provided by citizens who
choose to report. While this solution does not replace Net Neutrality, it offers one alternative approach that allows states to maintain baseline control
over the quality of Internet services being offered to their citizens.

V. CONCLUSION
The Internet, as it exists today, could soon become victim to the damaging effects of concentrated control and corporate greed. ISP’s ability to
456. Liz Robbins, A Victory for Spectrum Cable Customers: Charter to Pay $75 Refunds
and Offer Free HBO, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/nyregion
/charter-cable-settlement-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/YU4C-LTN7]; see Charter Commc’ns,
Inc., 2018 WL 919991, at *18.
457. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 2018 WL 919991, at *25.
458. See generally id. at *5–9.
459. FED. COMM. COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON OPEN INTERNET TRANSPARENCY RULE
REQUIREMENTS (2016).
460. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 2018 WL 919991, at *24.
461. Id. at *8 (citation omitted).
462. See generally Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that California’s law requiring insurance companies to publicly disclose their policies was federally
preempted).
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block, throttle, and prioritize content will stifle innovation in the online
streaming service industry, ultimately harming small businesses and consumers.463 With ISPs seemingly standing as the only party to benefit, consumers, state and local governments, and private organizations need to begin
asking: How does this repeal benefit me?464
How the non-neutral net will affect consumers and online streaming
services long-term is unknown at this time.465 But whether these changes
mean that consumers will be unable to access their favorite content online,466
or unable access breaking news when a natural disaster affects their area,467
the principle is the same: an Internet without Net Neutrality is not an Internet
which serves the American people. Film and television provide society with
a medium in which we may illustrate our current attitudes, fears, and fumbles.468 It is this creativity which forms the anthropological roadmap of human evolution. With the D.C. Circuit Court upholding RIFO,469 and the success of equivalent state Internet regulations unclear, proponents of net
neutrality should begin inquiring into other ways to keep the Internet unrestricted and free. Encouraging alternatives like municipal provision of
broadband or city-wide broadband monitoring could be the only way to preserve the Internet as a creative powerhouse which benefits all.

463. Schaub, supra note 20 at 70–71.
464. See id. at 70.
465. Dinha, supra note 35.
466. See, e.g., Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.,
23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13028, 13031 (2008) (describing Comcast’s interference with subscriber’s access
to content using BitTorrent).
467. Phil Helsel, Verizon Admits ‘throttling’ Data to Calif. Firefighters Amid Blaze, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/verizon-admits-throttling-data-calif-firefighters-amid-blaze-n902991 [https://perma.cc/2RFZ-EGDN] (describing Verizon’s throttling of Santa Clara County fire station during a fire); Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d
1, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
468. See David Heuring, Preserving Our Heritage: Film Remains the Best Archive Material, INT’L DOCUMENTARY ASS’N (Dec. 2004), https://www.documentary.org/feature/preservingour-heritage-film-remains-best-archive-material [https://perma.cc/A5KC-B3WZ].
469. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 18, 35.

